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2I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Shindano is a sixty-year-old woman who lives on the island of Zanzibar, a semi-
autonomous region of Tanzania.1 She has been residing in the small village of 
Mkokotoni, where she has had to survive without support from her husband, Abu, for the 
last five months.  After five years of marriage, Abu ordered Shindano out of his home, 
telling her to “leave [his] house and go back to be with [her] fellow dogs, slatterns, and 
lunatics.”  While Abu initially supported her for a few months, he has not helped her 
financially for some time.  Shindano now seeks to dissolve her marriage to Abu in the 
local kadhi’s court, claiming that Abu’s statements and actions constitute a divorce under 
Islamic law.  The court denies Shindano’s request because Abu never uttered or wrote the 
appropriate Islamic divorce formula.  She is ordered to return to her husband and treat 
him well; the court orders Abu to support his wife and respect her.      
This story is an example of a typical divorce proceeding within the kadhi’s court 
system of Zanzibar.  Had Shindano been a man, however, or a non-Muslim, or a resident 
of mainland Tanzania (“Tanganyika”), the result of this proceeding may have been very 
different.  Courts in Tanganyika and Zanzibar each recognize and enforce the right of 
Muslim men to unilaterally divorce their wives under Islamic law.  Yet, Tanganyika’s 
family law in addition provides for a uniform, secular marriage dissolution process, 
which is available to both men and women regardless of religious affiliation.  In 
Zanzibar, marriages between Muslims are dissolved solely in accordance with principles 
of Islamic law, while non-Muslims do not have any official statutes to govern their 
divorce proceedings. 
 
1 Erin Elizabeth Stiles, A Kadhi and His Court: Marriage, Divorce, and Zanzibar’s Islamic Legal Tradition 
288 (Aug. 2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Washington University) (on file with John M. Olin 
Library, Washington Univ.) [hereinafter Stiles, A Kadhi and His Court]. 
3The United Republic of Tanzania (“the Republic”), a political union of two semi-
autonomous entities, the mainland area of Tanganyika and the islands of Zanzibar,2 is a 
nation composed of multiple ethnic, religious, and tribal groups.  Like most of its African 
neighbors, Tanzania underwent a period of colonization, during which a series of 
European nations ruled over both Tanganyika and Zanzibar.  These colonizers established 
a dual system of law – one legal system for the European population and another for the 
indigenous inhabitants.  Following independence, Tanzania and its neighbors on the 
continent sought to shed this discriminatory form of justice and establish a system that 
represented and respected the culture of its people.  Because the borders drawn by 
European colonial powers were virtually arbitrary in nature, many of the newly-
independent states that succeeded those former colonies also inherited the same political 
boundaries.  As a result, countries such as Tanzania are populated by a heterogeneous 
citizenry, the members of which belong to any number of ethnic, racial, religious, and 
tribal communities.   
This article examines the problems that arise when multicultural societies adopt a 
pluralist system of justice in order to preserve the traditions of its diverse communities, 
using Tanzania as a case study.  The authors illustrate that despite Tanzania’s 
considerable efforts in balancing individual and group rights, its political leaders have 
replaced the nation’s colonial legal system with one that is still fragmented and 
discriminatory.  In order to accommodate its various religious and ethnic groups, 
Tanzania established a pluralistic legal system that while laudable in its objectives, denies 
some of its citizens the basic equal protection guarantees provided in the Tanzanian 
 
2 Kenneth McK. Norrie, Administration of Justice in Tanzania and Zanzibar: A Comparison of Two 
Judicial Systems in One Country, 38 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 395 (1989).   
4Constitution and under international law.  This problem is especially symptomatic in 
family law, a sensitive area that implicates the most sacrosanct of personal relations and 
delineates the outermost boundaries of community membership.  As evidenced by the 
laws of marriage and divorce currently in force, Tanzania affords its citizens radically 
different rights based on their gender, religion, and place of origin.  While Tanzanian 
matrimonial law represents a relatively narrow field of academic inquiry, the lessons 
drawn from an investigation into this legal and cultural milieu can be illuminating when 
placed within the context of larger issues affecting multicultural societies.  The so-called 
“paradox of multicultural vulnerability”3 affects not only young, postcolonial nations in 
Africa4 and Asia5, but also individuals in cosmopolitan, economically-developed 
countries such as Israel,6 the United States,7 and Canada.8
3 AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS 3
(2001) [hereinafter SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS]. 
4 See, e.g., Boaventura de Sousa Santos, The Heterogenous State and Legal Pluralism in Mozambique, 40 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 39 (2006); Aili Mari Tripp, The Politics of Women’s Rights and Cultural Diversity in 
Uganda, in GENDER JUSTICE, DEVELOPMENT, AND RIGHTS 427-32 (Maxine Molyneux & Shahrashoub 
Razavi, eds., 2002); Anne Hellum, Human Rights and Gender Relations in Postcolonial Africa: Options 
and Limits for the Subjects of Legal Pluralism, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 635 (2000); David M. Bigge & 
Amelie von Briesen, Note, Conflict in the Zimbabwean Courts: Women’s Rights and Indigenous Self-
Determination in Magaya v. Magaya, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 289 (2000); Anne Griffiths, Reconfiguring 
Law: An Ethnographic Perspective from Botswana, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 587 (1998). 
5 See, e.g., Pratibha Jain, Balancing Minority Rights and Gender Justice: The Impact of Protecting 
Multiculturalism on Women’s Rights in India, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 20 (2005). 
6 See id. at 57-60 (discussing the plight of the agunah, a woman who is “anchored” into a marriage under 
Jewish law by virtue of her husband’s refusal to grant a divorce). 
7 See Brenda Oppermann, The Impact of Legal Pluralism on Women’s Status: An Examination of Marriage 
Laws in Egypt, South Africa, and the United States, 17 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 65, 87-90 (2006); Ayelet 
Shachar, Group Identity and Women’s Rights in Family Law: The Perils of Multicultural Accommodation,
6 J. POL. PHIL. 285, 285 (1998) [hereinafter Shachar, Group Identity and Women’s Rights] (citing the U.S. 
Supreme Court case, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), which declined to interfere with 
gender-biased qualifications for Native American tribal membership). 
8 In 2003, the Canadian Society of Muslims proposed the establishment of Islamic family law arbitral 
tribunals in the province of Ontario, a campaign that incited a backlash in the media and in political circles.  
See generally James Thornback, The Portrayal of Sharia in Ontario, 10 APPEAL 1 (2005).  Many of the 
criticisms related to the potential intricacies involved in reconciling competing bodies of secular and 
religious law, including “the conflict between the various schools of Islamic law and deciding which one 
would apply, the conflict between the civil courts applying religious law or instead a separate religious 
court, and the conflict between certain aspects of Muslim family law and various human rights treaties.”  
Lawrence Blackstone, Courting Islam: Practical Alternatives to a Muslim Family Court in Ontario, 31 
5Part II of this article describes the phenomenon of legal pluralism and the impact 
it has on the individual rights of women belonging to communities whose discriminatory 
cultural practices have been accommodated by the state.9 Part III narrows in on Tanzania 
by offering a brief political history of the nation,10 while Part IV describes the 
development of Tanzania’s multifaceted legal system.11 Part V surveys the current law of 
marriage and divorce in Tanzania, highlighting the differentiated nature of justice 
available to parties in both Tanganyika and Zanzibar.12 Part VI then explores ways to 
alleviate the discrimination written into Tanzania’s marriage and divorce laws while 
acknowledging the significant obstacles that hinder programs for reform in Tanzania.13 
II.  LEGAL PLURALISM AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS: AN OVERVIEW 
 
Like many countries that lived through the colonial experience, Tanzania 
inherited a “legal stew” of European laws superimposed upon or existing concurrently 
with indigenous systems of customary and religious law.14 This phenomenon, which is 
known as “legal pluralism,” has given rise to a field of academic inquiry devoted to the 
study of how multiple sets of norms, both formal and informal, interact with each other 
and affect their subjects.15 For purposes of this article, the investigation will be limited to 
the “juristic” view of legal pluralism, which refers to the situation where “the sovereign 
 
BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 207, 218 (2005).  The provincial legislature ultimately responded in February 2006 
by banning binding arbitration based on religion in the resolution of family law disputes.  Kelly Gillespie, 
‘One law for all Ontarians’ in divorce, child custody, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 16, 2006, at A5.  For a 
historically-grounded analysis of the rhetoric behind the sharia debate in Ontario, see Anver M. Emon, 
Islamic Law and the Canadian Mosaic: Politics, Jurisprudence, and Multicultural Accommodation, SING.
J. LEGAL STUD., (forthcoming 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=898924. 
9 See Infra, Part II. 
10 See Infra, Part III. 
11 See Infra, Part IV. 
12 See Infra, Part V. 
13 See Infra, Part VI. 
14 Jennifer L. Rakstad et al., The Progress of Tanzanian Women in the Law: Women in Legal Education, 
Legal Employment and Legal Reform, 10 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 35, 92 (2000). 
15 Grant R. Woodman, Legal Pluralism and the Search for Justice, 40 J. AFR. L. 152, 157-158 (1996). 
6commands different bodies of law for different groups of the population varying by 
ethnicity, religion, nationality, or geography, and when the parallel legal regimes are all 
dependent on the state legal system.”16 
Not surprisingly, the legal pluralist paradigm has been criticized for a number 
reasons, chiefly stemming from its reputation as being “unnecessarily complex, as 
denying the principle of equality before the law, as underpinning grossly unjust modes of 
production or racial discrimination.”17 The argument for applying simpler rules of law 
springs from the idea that justice is not easily achieved if its administration is too 
complicated.18 Perhaps even more troublesome is the issue of equality before the law.  
Tanzania’s pluralist legal system, which is the main focus of this article, is a prime 
example of multicultural accommodation, wherein the state “attempts to facilitate groups’ 
practices and norms, for example, by exempting group members from certain laws, or by 
 
16 Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 869, 871 (1988).  Legal pluralism has also 
come to describe an anthropologically-oriented study of competing normative systems.  This broader 
conception, called “deep legal pluralism” by Gordon Woodman, extends the concept of “law” to include 
non-state modes of social ordering.  Indeed, the juristic view of legal pluralism, or “state law pluralism,” 
“has sometimes been said not to be true legal pluralism, or at least not to be a form of legal pluralism which 
can be of interest social science.”  Woodman, supra note 15, at 158.  Gunther Teubner sums up the ethos of 
the deep legal pluralist approach thus:  
 
Postmodern jurists love legal pluralism.  They do not care about the law of the centralized 
State with its universalist aspirations.  It is the “asphalt law” of the Brasilian favelas, the 
informal counter-rules of the patchwork of minorities, the quasi-laws of dispersed ethnic, 
religious, and cultural groups, the disciplinary techniques of “private justice,” the 
plurality of non-State laws in associations, formal organizations, and informal networks 
where they find the ingredients of postmodernity: the local, the plural, the subversive.  
 
Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1443, 1443 
(1991).  See also Dolores A. Donovan & Getachaw Assefa, Homicide in Ethiopia: Human Rights, 
Federalism, and Legal Pluralism, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 505, 542 (2005) (distinguishing between formal and 
anthropological concepts of legal pluralism). 
17 Woodman, supra note 15, at 159. 
18 Id. at 161.   
7awarding identity groups some degree of self-governance.”19 As a result, legal pluralism 
“provides for different norms to be applied to different persons in the same situation.20 
While it has been pointed out that unequal treatment of individuals does not 
automatically make a set of laws unjust,21 systems that follow a model of multicultural 
accommodation pose a unique problem, which has been identified by Ayelet Shachar as 
“the paradox of multicultural vulnerability.”22 In a diverse nation-state, allowing various 
religious and cultural groups to manage their own affairs in areas like family law 
increases the autonomy that these populations enjoy.23 Indeed, the idea that multicultural 
accommodation is antithetical to the principles of liberal democracy has eroded in recent 
years.24 Unfortunately, expansion of communal rights can encroach on the individual 
rights of particular group members who also fall within “traditionally subordinated 
 
19 Shachar, Group Identity and Women’s Rights, supra note 7, at 286. 
20 Woodman, supra note 15, at 160. 
21 Id. at 162 (arguing that no legal system provides for absolute equality under the law). 
22 SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS, supra note 3, at 3; see also Shachar, Group Identity and 
Women’s Rights, supra note 7, at 289. 
23 Shachar, Group Identity and Women’s Rights, supra note 7, at 289. Family law is an especially crucial 
arena where the debate over multicultural accommodation plays out because it “demarcates membership 
boundaries in two related ways: first, by developing complex lineage rules which determine who, by virtue 
of birth, is eligible for acquiring full membership in the group, and secondly, by defining who by way of 
marriage can become a group member.”  SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS, supra note 3, at 51-
52.   
24 See generally, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE (1989); IRIS MARION 
YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990); Jürgen Habermas, Address, Multiculturalism 
and the Liberal State, 47 STAN. L. REV. 849, 850-51 (1995).  Theorists have traditionally asserted that 
liberalism’s exaltation of individual autonomy to be in conflict with multiculturalism’s preoccupation with 
securing communal rights.  There has been greater recognition, however, that social attachments are “one 
of the principal ways in which person define themselves,” thus leading to the result that “group-
differentiated rights are now substantially more likely to be defended as essential to individual well-being.”  
Eric J. Mitnick, Individual Vulnerability and Cultural Transformation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1635, 1636-37, 
1640 (2003) (reviewing SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS, supra note 3].  Additionally, 
defenders of multicultural policies have asserted that such measures “help[] to remedy the disadvantages 
which minorities suffer within difference-blind institutions,” which in fact may be “implicitly tilted towards 
the needs, interests, and identities of the majority group . . . creat[ing] a range of burdens, barriers, 
stigmatizations, and exclusions for members of minority groups.”  Will Kymlicka, Comments on Shachar 
and Spinner-Halev: An Update from the Multiculturalism Wars, in MULTICULTURAL QUESTIONS (Christian 
Joppke & Steven Lukes eds., 1999).  
8classes, such as women.”25 Where group norms provide for discriminatory treatment of 
such classes, “the state’s multicultural policies conflate the language of ‘respect to 
groups’ with a license to subordinate specific group members.”26 
Over the years, scholars and activists, particularly in the area of international 
development, have engaged the problem of women’s rights and cultural tradition in the 
developing world in a number of ways.27 During the early 1970s, the liberal feminist 
movement sought to end the invisibility of women in the economic life of impoverished 
nations by decrying “backward and oppressive traditions that constrain women’s 
freedom.”28 However, casually denouncing traditional practices as retrograde and 
incompatible with the modern concept of human rights glosses over the complex 
dynamics of the communities where those rules are applied.  As Brenda Oppermann 
points out, “in many countries traditional law is often the only form of law known to 
many people, particularly those living in nonurban areas.”29 Thus, customary or religious 
law may be the chief guarantor of order in communities where the state’s reach is weak.30 
In relation to the issue of sexual equality, the one-dimensional portrayal of women as 
 
25 Shachar, Group Identity and Women’s Rights, supra note 7, at 289. Female members of minority groups 
may thus be subject to double-subordination as a “minority within a minority.”  See generally MINORITIES 
WITHIN MINORITIES: EQUALITY, RIGHTS, AND DIVERSITY (Avigail Eisenberg & Jeff Spinner-Halev eds., 
2005) (exploring conflicts between members within minority groups). 
26 Id. at 291. 
27 See Celestine I. Nyamu, How Should Human Rights and Development Respond to Cultural 
Legitimization of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries?, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 381, 383 (2000). 
28 Id. at 384. 
29 Oppermann, supra note 7, at 66. 
30 Id. at 91; see also Leila Chirayath et al., Customary Law and Policy Reform: Engaging with the Plurality 
of Justice Systems 6 (2005) (background paper for the World Development Report 2006: Equality and 
Development, World Bank), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2006/Resources/477383-
1118673432908/Customary_Law_and_Policy_Reform.pdf (last visited May 13, 2006) (“Even if state 
systems do not lack legitimacy, they may be at odds with prevailing systems of conflict mediation within a 
particular community and/or be predominantly inaccessible due to geographical and socioeconomic 
barriers, or alternatively due to a luck of knowledge or awareness of the system on the part of political 
leaders . . . . In many cases state regimes do not have the capacity or legitimacy to fill in the gaps in social 
ordering and conflict resolution when local level systems are undermined . . .  when neither formal nor 
informal mechanisms are functioning, human rights abuses and serious conflict are more likely to occur.”). 
9long-suffering victims of pre-modern custom ignores the agency of individuals who live 
out each day ably negotiating their roles across the social landscape.31 This binary 
opposition between helpless Third World women and their liberated Western 
counterparts can thus reinforce colonialist stereotypes,32 with universalist notions of 
human rights33 masquerading as “the interrogation of one culture by another culture – 
specifically, by the Western liberal culture . . . that is a logical outgrowth of 
Christianity.”34 
The late 1970s ushered in a more class-conscious view of gender relations that 
relied heavily on Marxist ideals.35 This materialist view concerned itself with the broader 
 
31 See Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1181, 1211 (2001); Hellum, 
supra note 4, at 644-46. 
32 Nyamu, supra note 27, at 386; see also Adrien Katherine Wing, Polygamy from Southern Africa to Black 
Britannia to Black America: Global Critical Race Feminism as Legal Reform for the Twenty-first Century,
11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 811, 814 (“Some westerners have been seen as trying to impose a western 
oriented value system that may reject polygamy and other cultural or religious practices as backward and 
sexist”); Cheryl  B. Preston, Women in Traditional Religions: Refusing to Let Patriarchy (or Feminism) 
Separate Us from the Source of Our Liberation, 22 MISS. C.L. REV. 185, 194 (2003) (“. . . Western 
feminists may inadvertently reduce Third World Women to the category of victim.”); Gila Stopler, 
Countenancing the Oppression of Women: How Liberals Tolerate Religious and Cultural Practices That 
Discriminate Against Women, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 154, 209-10 (2003) (“ . . . the way in which 
outsiders to the community assume and accept the existence of discriminatory practices against women in 
minority communities is in itself a form of racism since it is based on the feelings of superiority that the 
outsiders have toward the community . . . [a] good example . . . is the way in which the imperial powers in 
the nineteenth century justified colonization by pointing to women’s inferior status in the subjugated 
cultures relative to their status in Europe . . .”). 
33 See Sundhya Pahuja, Comparative Visions of Global Public Order (Part I): The Postcoloniality of 
International Law, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 459, 466-469 (2005) (arguing the so-called “universal” human 
rights fail to include indigenous perspectives, thus reinforcing ideals of Western cultural superiority); Sally 
Engle Merry, From Law and Colonialism to Law and Globalization, 28 Law & Soc. Inquiry 569, 582-83 
(2003) (reviewing MARTIN CHANOCK, LAW, CUSTOM, AND SOCIAL ORDER: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE IN 
MALAWI AND ZAMBIA (1998)) (maintaining that the contemporary rhetoric of “traditional culture” “still 
impugns the rationality and inventiveness of traditional peoples, defined as those living in the developing 
countries of the global South.”). 
34 Suzanne Last Stone, Cultural Pluralism, Nationalism, and Universal Rights, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1211, 
1217 (2000); see also Pahuja, supra note 33, at 459.  One concern among African human rights scholars 
has been the need for stronger protection of indigenous cultures on the international level.  Because the 
right of religious freedom can include the right to proselytize, the spread of Christianity and Islam has been 
seen as an encroachment on traditional religious beliefs.  See Makau wa Mutua, Limitations on Religious 
Rights: Problematizing Religious Freedom in the African Context, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 75 (1999). 
35 Nyamu, supra note 27, at 383. 
10
socioeconomic inequalities that ultimately resulted in the exploitation of women.36 
Accordingly, more basic concerns such as the right to food and shelter took precedence 
over “issues . . . most easily identifiable as concerns to relatively privileged women in the 
West . . . includ[ing] violations that threaten the freedom of movement, freedom of dress, 
freedom of bodily integrity, and freedom of control over one’s sexuality.”37 This stance 
contrasts with the classic feminist approach that focuses an allegedly disproportionate 
amount of attention on forms of “alien and bizarre oppression of women of color,” such 
as “sati, dowry death, veiling, female genital surgeries, female infanticide, marriage by 
capture, purdah, polygamy, footbinding, and arranged marriages.”38 Although the 
materialist view may draw attention to the larger structural conditions that result in 
female oppression, it has been criticized for being dismissive of the various cultural 
practices that have a specific and direct impact on women.39 
A more recent, postmodern school of thought that developed in the 1980s focuses 
on the structure of gender relations and how the roles assigned to men and women 
perpetuates inequality.40 This view takes a “comprehensive approach to social relations 
[that] considers other forms of social differentiation (such as race, class, ethnicity, and 
age) to be as important as gender.”41 Consequently, proposed remedial measures are 
designed to not just assist women, but also “change both gender roles and the system 
through which they are defined, demand[ing] far-reaching reform in gender relations, 
 
36 Id. at 386. 
37 Volpp, supra note 31, at 1210.  Celestine Nyamu notes that “[w]ithin Western-based international 
women’s rights scholarship and practice . . . the issue of control of economic resources (including land) by 
women has not gained prominence.  This omission stems from a bias in the human rights practice that 
emphasizes civil and political rights over economic, social, and cultural rights.”  Nyamu, supra note 27, at 
399. 
38 Id. at 1208. 
39 Nyamu, supra note 27, at 387. 
40 Id. at 383, 387. 
41 Id. at 387. 
11
especially at the family level.”42 The radical reforms envisioned by the postmodern 
approach would be impracticable to achieve since they “require an overhaul of social, 
economic, and political institutions.”43 
The majority of human rights groups pursue an “abolitionist approach” that 
echoes the feminist view’s call to eliminate cultural practices that contradict the 
principles of international human rights law.44 The abolitionist approach thus seeks to 
achieve its goals by enacting legislation that would serve to substitute local custom.  
However, opponents of this brand of top-down reform have argued that the abolitionist 
approach frequently does not adequately consider the cultural context that surrounds 
controversial practices, thus failing to propose comprehensive solutions.  Not 
surprisingly, local observers have bristled at the imperialist undertones of abolitionism, 
which advances proposals that are viewed as “decontextualized, hegemonic, and 
counterproductive for gender equality in practice.”45 
Indeed, the wholesale importation of Western political ideals and institutions can 
produce unintended consequences when applied across a vastly different cultural 
landscape.46 Furthermore, reforms that are aggressively imposed on a community from 
the outside may be interpreted as an assault on that community’s identity, thus provoking 
more rigid interpretations of community tradition to the detriment of subordinated 
 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 388. 
44 Id. at 392. 
45 Id. at 394. 
46 See Stone, supra note 34, at 1217.  For example, Woodman counsels that “it has been frequently 
observed an intervention by the state to change or suppress the oft-criticized practice of marriage payments 
(“bride-price”, lobolo) may have far-reaching and unforeseen effects on the social structure of the people 
involved.”  Woodman, supra note 15, at 166. 
12
members.47 For example, the Indian Supreme Court’s 1985 ruling in Mohammed Ahmed 
Khan v. Shah Bano Begum,48 which granted maintenance to a divorced woman beyond 
what was required by Islamic law, mobilized Muslim communities into mounting a 
successful campaign to have the legislature over the decision.49 India had already been 
experiencing intense sectarian strife at the time and thus many Muslims perceived Shah
Bano as a “part of a pattern to assimilate [them] and others into the larger Hindu 
culture.”50 Ironically, Muslim women living in multicultural India now have much more 
limited legal recourse in disputes over maintenance, unlike their counterparts in majority 
Muslim countries, such as Egypt.51 
A preferable alternative to abolitionism incorporates both cross-cultural dialogue 
and internal discourse in arriving at solutions that protect the rights of women.52 This 
approach would recognize the value of international norms, but then tailor them to fit the 
circumstances on the ground.  Thus, a deep understanding of the indigenous milieu, that 
is, “the meaning and dialing existential experience of culture,” is essential.53 Indeed, 
lessons about the importance of the compatibility of foreign legal concepts to local 
circumstances are already being unearthed in the areas of corporate governance and 
 
47 See Jeff Spinner-Halev, Feminism, Multiculturalism, Oppression, and the State, 112 ETHICS 84, 96 
(2001). 
48 (1985) 1 S.C.S. 96. 
49 Jain, supra note 5, at 215-17; Spinner-Halev, supra note 47, at 100. 
50 Spinner-Halev, supra note 47, at 100. 
51 Ayelet Shachar, Religion, State, and the Problem of Gender: New Modes of Citizenship and Governance 
in Diverse Societies, 50 MCGILL L.J. 49, 68-69 (2005) [hereinafter Shachar, Religion, State, and the 
Problem of Gender]. 
52 Nyamu, supra note 27, at 393-94. 
53 For outside observers, this can be achieved through the concept of “world traveling,” a concept 
developed from Critical Race Feminism, wherein “we see ourselves in historical context, see ourselves as 
the ‘other’ might see us, and see the ‘other’ within her own complex cultural and legal context.”  Wing, 
supra note 32, at 813.     
13
antitrust law.54 Emerging literature on the so-called “transplant effect” illustrates how 
legal systems that are transplanted from other countries, such as in the case of 
colonialism, tend to be less effective as applied in receiving nations where there is a 
“mismatch between preexisting conditions and transplanted law.”55 While similar 
analyses have yet to be performed in other areas of law, it is reasonable to conclude that 
any substantial program of legal reform should be carried out with the support of the 
members of the community whose traditions will be affected.56 
III.  A BRIEF POLITICAL HISTORY OF TANZANIA 
 
Missionary zeal in the nineteenth century first incited European interest in 
Tanganyika,57 with Germany occupying the region from the late 1800s until the end of 
World War I.58 Following the war, Germany passed control of Tanganyika to Britain 
pursuant to a League of Nations mandate.59 During this time, the British chief 
representative had the power to make ordinances with respect to local customs and laws 
for the good government of the country.60 Britain then ruled Tanganyika as a United 
 
54 See generally Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, The Transplant Effect, 51 
AM. J. COMP. L. 163 (2003). 
55 Id. at 168. 
56 See Shachar, Religion, State, and the Problem of Gender, supra note 51, at 60; Spinner-Halev, supra note 
47, at 107-08.  For example, the campaign against female genital mutilation (“FGM”) among the Sebei 
people of Uganda was initially met with resistance by community elders, who felt that the practice was an 
integral part of Sebei identity.  Those leaders eventually became less defensive about such “outside 
interference” after women’s groups began framing the issue of FGM in terms of health and safety, rather 
than human rights.  Educational programs highlighting the dangers of FGM were ultimately successful, 
leading to a marked decline in the practice by the Sebei.  See Tripp, supra note 4, at 427-32. 
57 History of Tanzania, http://www.tanzania.go.tz/historyf.html (last visited May 17, 2006) 
58 Background Note: Tanzania, U.S. Dep’t of State, Mar. 2006, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2843.htm 
[hereinafter History]. 
59 Id.; The German Empire ceded its colonies to Allied powers by virtue of Article 119 of the Versailles 
Peace Treaty.  Norrie, supra note 2, at 397.  In 1918, the U.S. President Woodrow Wilson announced that 
the German colonies “should be declared the property of the League of Nations.” Kenneth Ingham, 
Tanganyika: The Mandate and Cameron 1919-1931, in HISTORY OF EAST AFRICA 544 (Vincent Harlow 
ed., 1965). 
60 Ingham, supra note 59. 
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Nations trust territory after World War II.61 The mid-twentieth century saw the first 
organized local elections and in December 1959, Britain granted self-government to 
Tanganyika following general elections that were held in August 1960.62 In May l961, 
Tanganyika achieved autonomy and wrote a new constitution.63 Full independence was 
secured on December 9, 1961.64 
Zanzibar began as an early Arab/Persian commercial center.65 The Portuguese 
established a trading post in Zanzibar in the latter part of the sixteenth century66 and 
dominated it throughout the seventeenth century.67 Omani Arabs retook Zanzibar in the 
early eighteenth century and by 1840 Sultan Seyyid Said transferred his capital from 
Muscat to Zanzibar.68 Zanzibar functioned as an independent Arab state until it became a 
British protectorate in the late nineteenth century.69 In exchange for the right to maintain 
the throne of Zanzibar, the sultan transferred all foreign relations matters to the British 
officials.70 Britain continued to rule Zanzibar through the sultanate until after World War 
II.71 During the mid-1940s, Britain began establishing local village and government 
councils.72 Six years after the first local elections took place in 1957, Zanzibar received 
 
61 History, supra note 58.   




66 Barbara Lee Diamonstein, Zanzibar’s Exotic Medley, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1989, at 8.   
67 History, supra note 58. 
68 Id. 
69 Stiles, A Kadhi and His Court, supra note 1. 
70 J.E. Flint, Zanzibar 1890-1950, in HISTORY OF EAST AFRICA, supra note 4, at 641.  Following the 
creation of the protectorate, the sultan gradually lost all political and financial control over Zanzibar.  
Despite the sultan’s power to choose his own successor, as early as 1892, the British chose and installed the 
succeeding Zanzibari sultans.  Id. at 641-46. Subsequent attempts to recover power by the Arab princes 
were met with military action by the British.  Id.   
71 History, supra note 58. 
72 Flint, supra note 70, at 669.   
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its independence from the United Kingdom, thus becoming a constitutional monarchy 
under the sultan.73 
In 1964, Zanzibar joined with Tanganyika three months after Zanzibari 
nationalists overthrew the archipelago’s Arab sultan in a bloody revolution.74 The United 
Republic of Tanzania was born on October 29,75 with Zanzibar maintaining significant 
political autonomy.76 In the late 1970s, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), 
which was the chief political party in the mainland, merged with the Afro-Shirazi Party 
(ASP) of Zanzibar to form the CCM (Chama cha Mapinduzi-CCM Revolutionary 
Party).77 This union was ratified pursuant to the Tanzanian constitution of 1977 and 
reinforced under later versions of the charter in 1982 and 1984.78 
IV.  DEVELOPMENT OF TANZANIA’S LEGAL SYSTEMS 
 
A.  Tanganyika 
 
The legal system in colonial East Africa created different systems of justice for 
Europeans and indigenous persons.79 For natives of Tanganyika, Germany created a 
judicial system that was closely tied to executive authority.80 Colonial district officers in 
charge of military stations could delegate adjudication of disputes to local leaders who 
also exercised executive functions.81 They were instructed to decide cases using local 
law because the German administration considered the Africans “insufficiently advanced 
 
73 Id. 
74 Simon Robinson, A Whiff of Revolt On Spice Islands; Thirty-six years after its union with Tanzania, 
Zanzibar considers divorce, TIME, Oct. 30, 2000.   
75 History, supra note 58. 
76 Id. 
77 Id.  
78 Id. 
79 Norrie, supra note 2, at 396. 
80 Anthony Allott, Development of the East African Legal System During the Colonial Period, in HISTORY 
OF EAST AFRICA 348 (D.A. Low ed., 1976). 
81 Id. at 396-97. 
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to come under German law.”82 Although the native law courts were not subject to any 
strict rule of law, they were to abide by general legal considerations and common sense.83 
Following the German handover of its colonies to the Allied Parties, Britain 
established the Tanganyika Order in Council as the basic law for the territory 
encompassing Tanganyika.84 Britain further enacted the Courts Ordinance to “regulate 
the administration of justice in the territory.”85 The Courts Ordinance maintained the 
previous system of separate adjudication for foreigners and the indigenous population86 
although appeals from the native courts could be sent to the colonial High Court.87 
Similar to the German design, the local tribunals were to be governed by the laws of the 
indigenous population as long as the laws were not “repugnant to justice and morality.”88 
For the white population of Tanganyika, Britain established courts of common law, 
including a district magistrate court, a resident magistrate court, and the High Court.89 
82 Id. at 397. 
83 Id. “The indigenous systems ranged in sophistication all the way from a centralized, highly developed, 
judicial structure and precisely formulated law . . . to the decentralized, mainly arbitral, adjudicatory 
institutions and more elastic legal systems.  Allott, supra note 80, at 365-66.  Europeans in British East 
Africa mainly viewed local indigenous systems as barbaric in their punishments and arbitrary in their 
modes of conviction and accusation.  Id.  at 366.  Traditional courts were allowed to continue due to a want 
of “necessary power” and “administrative machinery.” Id.  
84 Norrie, supra note 2, at 397.   
85 Id. 
86 Id.  Unlike the Germans, however, responsibility for native courts was placed “fully and solely” in the 
hands of the British administration.  Allott, supra note 80, at 372.  However, the British administration tried 
to preserve the previous nature of these courts.  Eugene Cotran, Tribal Factors in the Establishment of the 
East African Legal Systems, in TRADITION AND TRANSITION IN EAST AFRICA 130 (P.H. Gulliver ed., 1969).  
The courts were made up of traditional local chiefs who also exercised executive power in the community, 
only had jurisdiction over the African population, and applied the customary law of the area.  Id. 
87 Norrie, supra note 2, at 398.   
88 Id. Such repugnancy clauses were also used in other British colonial jurisdictions, such as West Africa, 
India, and New Zealand.  See Modibo Ocran, The Clash of Legal Cultures: The Treatment of Indigenous 
Law in Colonial and Post-Colonial Africa, 39 AKRON L. REV. 465, 470, 475 (2006); Nan Seuffert, Shaping 
the Modern Nation: Colonial Marriage Law, Polygamy and Concubinage in Aotearoa New Zealand, 7
LTC 186 (2003), J.N. Matson, The Common Law Abroad: English and Indigenous Laws in the British 
Commonwealth, 42 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 753, 760-61 (1993). 
89 Norrie, supra note 2, at 398-90.  “The High Court had an exclusive and a concurrent original jurisdiction 
as well as one as a court of appeal.  A further appeal lay to the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa (in 
Kenya).” Id.  At this time, under the British administration, most of East Africa had become a “largely 
integrated law area”, despite the region’s divergent histories.  Allott, supra note 80, at 350.  In the early 
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As with its other East African territories, Britain enacted a legal code based on the 
statutes it enforced in India.90 
According to Eugene Cotran, this dual system resulted in “an almost complete 
isolation of the African courts and customary law in the colonial era . . . Furthermore, 
there appears to have been a general lack of interest by the colonial governments in the 
problems arising from the content and application of the customary law.”91 This apathy 
meant that the British made no effort to study or record customary law,92 the principles of 
which were treated as a matter of fact and not law.93 As a result, conflicts between 
customary and statutory law remained unresolved.94 Furthermore, customary law was 
not the province of the professional lawyer because advocates could not appear before the 
African courts.95 
Following independence in 1961, Tanganyika became a member of the British 
Commonwealth and terminated the system of appeals to the Crown.96 Most notably, 
Tanganyika instituted a complete separation between the executive and the judiciary and 
eliminated the parallel, raced-based court system.97 During this time, the challenge for 
Tanganyika and its East African neighbors was to unify their legal systems so that “no 
one should find himself living at one and the same time under two kinds of law, English 
 
1950s, the British system was reviewed and reforms were introduced in Tanganyika.  Id. at 375.  Native 
courts became “local courts: and although still customary in origin and jurisdiction, had specialized 
benches with more sophisticated backgrounds.  Id. This development was to foreshadow the evolution of 
local court systems in Tanzania.  Id.   
90 See generally Allott, supra note 80. 
91 Cotran, supra note 86, at 131-132. 
92 Id. at 132. 
93 Id.  
94 Id. at 132-33. 
95 Id. at 133. 
96 Norrie, supra note 2, at 400. 
97 Id.  
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and African, and in the sense that persons of different communities or races should not 
find themselves, by reason only of their origin, placed under different legal systems.”98 
The Magistrates’ Courts Acts of 1963 and 1984 established a unitary three-tier 
court system in Tanganyika.99 The first tier consists of subordinate courts, including 
primary courts, district courts, and resident magistrates’ courts.100 The primary court is 
the lowest court in the country, with jurisdiction extending to civil cases where the 
applicable law is customary or Islamic law, as well as disputes involving minor civil 
debts and matrimonial proceedings.101 The High Court102 follows in the hierarchy and 
exercises jurisdiction over Tanganyika only.103 The Court of Appeal is the highest court 
and is competent to hear appeals from both Tanganyikan and Zanzibari court 
decisions.104 
B.  Zanzibar 
 
The development of the Zanzibari legal system differed from that of Tanganyika.  
Although a minority, Arabs created a strong Arab-Muslim influence on Zanzibar by 
virtue of their economic dominance.105 During the British protectorate era, the courts 
 
98 Allott, supra note 80, at 382.   
99 Norrie, supra note 2, at 400.  At this time, Tanganyika chose to have one written criminal code 
applicable to all its residents.  Cotran, supra note 86, at 143.  In terms of civil law, Tanganyika chose a full-
scale unification of all customary laws.  Id. This approach was criticized because 1) the unified laws do not 
represent the law of any one tribe; 2) the unified law would not satisfy any of the communities; 3) the 
reforms were half-hearted; 4) people would avoid the courts; and 5) codification hinders development of 
new legislation.  Id. at 143-144.  For more on community responses to this campaign of legal unification, 
see M.E.R. Nicholson, Change without Conflict: A Case Study of Legal Change in Tanzania, 7 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 747 (1973). 
100 Norrie, supra note 2, at 400.   
101 Id.  
102 See TANZ. CONST. (1997) art. 108(1)   
103 “Except where the law confers jurisdiction specifically on the ‘High Court of Tanzania.’”  Norrie, supra 
note 2, at 402.  
104 Id. at 403. 
105 Id. at 399.   
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were comprised of a British jurisdiction and a Zanzibari one.106 The former consisted of 
a High Court and lower courts called British subordinate courts.107 As in other East 
African territories, the civil and criminal codes of British India applied.108 A parallel 
system existed for Zanzibar, consisting of the Sultan’s Court and the subordinate 
courts.109 The subordinate courts consisted of first-, second-, and third-class subordinate 
courts, kadhis’ courts, and juvenile courts.110 The kadhis’ courts “administered a limited 
range of civil litigation in which the parties were Muslims.”111 
Following Britain’s grant of self-government in 1963, Zanzibar drafted the 
Constitution of the State of Zanzibar.112 The Courts Decree, which was enacted after the 
fall of the sultan’s government in 1964, created the High Court113, district courts, kadhis’ 
courts, primary courts, and juvenile courts.114 The British courts were abolished after 
independence.   
 The People’s Court Decree 1969 introduced a separate court structure for 
Zanzibar, comprised of the people’s area courts, the people’s district courts, the kadhis’ 
courts, the High Court, and the Supreme Council.115 Legislation in 1984 and 1985116 
106 Id.  Indeed, the first British jurisdiction established in East Africa was in the Sultanate of Zanzibar.  
Allott, supra note 80, at 350.  “The most important legal fact about the East African territories was that 
they abutted on the Indian Ocean.  The system of codified law introduced into British India, the criminal 
and civil courts and the procedure that they followed, were copied or applied in the British East African 
possessions; and it was through Zanzibar that this Indian influence came to the mainland territories.”   Id.  
The 1884 Order in Council (Art. 8(a)) even directed British courts in Zanzibar to apply the Statute law as 
applied by courts in Bombay.  Id. at 351.  Appeals from the British sphere on the East Coast of Africa 
(except for Zanzibar) were to be sent to the Supreme Court at Bombay.  Id. at 354.   
107 Norrie, supra note 2, at 399.
108 See generally Allott, supra note 80, at 348-368. 
109 Norrie, supra note 2, at 399.
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 403. 
113 Article 92 of the Constitution also established the High Court. Id. at 403 n.50.   
114 Courts Decree, No. 22 of 1963; see also id. at 403. 
115 Id. In the late 1970s, Zanzibar also drafted the Constitution of the Revolutionary Government of 
Zanzibar 1979.  Id. 
116 See High Court Act 1985; Kadhis’ Court Act 1985; Magistrates’ Courts Act 1985. 
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ended the system of people’s courts and replaced it with common law-style 
adjudication.117 This legislation ushered in three types of courts in Zanzibar: the High 
Court of Zanzibar, the kadhis’ court, and the magistrates’ court.118 
The High Court is the chief court in Zanzibar and enjoys unlimited jurisdiction 
over both civil and criminal cases.119 Appeals from the High Court lie with the Court of 
Appeal of Tanzania.120 Below the High Court are three types of magistrates’ courts.121 
The primary magistrate court has limited civil and criminal powers,122 while the district 
court has both original and appellate jurisdiction along with greater civil and criminal 
powers.123 The resident magistrates exercises original and appellate jurisdiction and 
hears all cases from the district magistrates’ courts.124 
The Kadhis’ Courts Act of 1985 established kadhis’ courts for every district and a 
Chief Kadhi’s Court for Zanzibar.125 The jurisdiction of the kadhis’ courts is restricted to 
questions of Muslim law in regards to personal status, marriage, divorce, and inheritance, 
as well as cases where all parties profess the Islamic faith.126 The rules of evidence 
applicable in a kadhi court depart from the rules normally prescribed by Islamic law: 
This departure is noticeable in two areas: in hearing evidence all witnesses 
called shall be heard without discrimination on grounds of religion, sex or 
otherwise; and each issue of fact shall be decided upon the assessment of 
 
117 Norrie, supra note 2, at 404.   
118 Id. 
119 Id.  
120 Id. The Court of Appeal of Tanzania has no jurisdiction in respect to interpreting the Constitution of 
Zanzibar, Islamic matters originating in the kadnis’ courts, and any other matter approved under the 
Constitution of Zanzibar or any other law enacted by the Zanzibar House of Representatives. Id.  
121 Id. at 405.  The three types of magistrates’ courts are resident magistrates’ courts, district courts, and 
primary courts; all established by the Magistrates’ Court Act 1985.  Id. 
122 Id. at 406. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Kadhis’ Courts Act 1985, Act No. 3.   
126 Norrie, supra note 2, at 407. 
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credibility of all evidence before the court and not upon the number of 
witnesses who have given evidence.127 
The Chief Kadhi’s Court acts as an appellate court for all kadhis’ courts and has no 
original jurisdiction.128 Appeals from the Chief Kadhi’s Court lie with the High Court, 
wherein the judges, along with four sheikhs, decide cases according to a majority vote,129 
which is final.130 
C.  United Republic of Tanzania 
 
Although Tanzania is a nation with two distinct court systems, the Court of 
Appeal and the Constitutional Court are two venues for judicial cooperation.  The Court 
of Appeal of Tanzania is the highest court in the Republic131 and can only hear appeals 
from the High Court and subordinate courts with special jurisdiction.132 The special 
Constitutional Court, which is provided for in both the Constitution of Zanzibar133 and 
the Constitution of the Republic of Tanzania,134 is charged with hearing disputes arising 
from interpretation of the Union Constitution “where such interpretation or its application 
is in dispute between the Government of the United Republic and the Revolutionary 
 
127 Id. at 407.  In 1998, lawmakers in Tanganyika drafted a bill that would reestablish the kadhis’ courts on 
the mainland, though ultimately no legislation was ever enacted.  Interestingly, these tribunals would retain 
the traditional Islamic laws of evidence, unlike the courts that were already operating in Zanzibar.  Robert 
Makaramba, The Secular State and the State of Islamic Law in Tanzania: With Particular Reference to 
Kadhi’s Courts Establishment Proposal 9 (July 2000) (paper presented at the Islamic Law in Africa Project 
Symposium, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, July 21-23, 2000) (on file with author).    
128 Kadhis’ Court Act.  
129 § 10(2);  see also Norrie, supra note 2, at 407.   
130 § 10(3).   
131 TANZ. CONST (1997) part IV.   
132 Appellate Jurisdiction Act, No. 15 of 1979 § 3. 
133 ZANZIBAR CONST. art. 123(2)(a). 
134 TANZ. CONST. arts. 125-128. 
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Government of Zanzibar.”135 The Constitutional Court reportedly has never met, as “any 
attempt to convene could be easily interpreted as an attempt to undermine the Union.”136 
V.  THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN TANZANIA 
 
A.  Unification of Marriage Law in Tanganyika: The Law of Marriage Act 
 
The movement for the unification of laws during the early postcolonial period in 
East Africa was most pronounced in the area of family law, which had been particularly 
beleaguered by the choice of law problems created by the plural legal system inherited 
from the British.137 The fact that individuals “rarely confined their actions within one 
system of law” encouraged much confusion and mischief.138 For example, Bart 
Rwezaura has noted the phenomenon of Christian men who enter into monogamous 
marriages and then use customary law to acquire additional wives, only to disavow 
obligations towards a subsequent spouse by disputing the legal effect of the later 
relationships.139 Additionally, courts dividing the property of persons who died intestate 
 
135 Id. at art. 126(1). 
136 Norrie, supra note 2, at 409.  In discussing the ineffectiveness of the Constitutional Court, Norrie states: 
“First, it must be noted that this Court has no basis in the Constitution.  To hear and settle disputes between 
the United Republic and Zanzibar is essentially a Union matter neither a constituent assembly . . . nor the 
Fifth Amendment made it a Union matter . . . Second, as the Constitution of the United Republic stipulates 
that Tanzania Mainland has no separate executive and legislature but is governed by the Union executive 
and legislature, and as the Zanzibaris are constitutionally represented in the government and legislature, it 
is impossible to settle disputes between Tanzania Mainland and Zanzibar.” Id.  
137 Bart Rwezaura, Tanzania: Building a New Family Law Out of a Plural Legal System, 33 U. LOUISVILLE 
J. FAM. L. 523, 523-524 (1995) [hereinafter Rwezaura, Building a New Family Law]. 
138 Id. at 524.  For issues that are to be decided according to customary or religious law, courts apply the 
“mode of life test” and examine whether an individual has lived his life in concert with a particular 
tradition or faith.  This test thus determines which of the three main bodies of law shall resolve the 
controversy.  Rakstad et al., supra note 14, at 93. 
139 Rwezaura, Building a New Family Law, supra note 137, at 524-25 (“. . . because of social and economic 
transformation, including the influence of Christianity, as well as the growth of urban centers, a number of 
Africans became partially incorporated into the Western system.”). 
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were often left with the unenviable task of deciding which rules to apply based on the 
community to which that individual purportedly belonged.140 
In order to untangle the competing bodies of family law, the African Conference 
on Local Courts and Customary Law was held in Dar es Salaam in 1963.141 This 
conference inspired the government of Kenya to create the Commission on the Law of 
Marriage and Divorce in 1967, which issued a report the following year and urged reform 
and integration of the disparate systems of religious, customary, and law via a proposed 
Law of Matrimony Act.142 Ultimately, the Commission’s efforts stalled in Kenya, where 
the draft bill was rejected by the legislature multiple times on the grounds that it was “un-
African, a model of English law that took insufficient account of African customs and 
traditions and gave too many rights to women.”143 
Tanzania, however, adopted the Kenyan model in overhauling its own family law 
system.144 Mapendekazo ya Serikali juu ya Sheria ya Ndoa (Government’s Proposals on 
Uniform Law of Marriage), Government Paper No. 1 of 1969, incorporated most of the 
reforms advanced by the Kenyan draft bill and provided the groundwork for Tanzania’s 
 
140 Id. at 525. 
141 Andreas Rahmatian, Termination of Marriage in Nigerian Family Laws: The Need for Reform and the 
Relevance of the Tanzanian Experience, 10 INT’L J.L. POL. & FAM. 281, 297 (1996).   
142 Id. 
143 Id. For accounts of how the state of family law in Kenya has fared over the years, see Abdulkadir 
Hashim, Muslim Personal Law in Kenya and Tanzania: Tradition and Innovation, 25 J. MUSLIM MINORITY 
AFF. 449 (2005), Catherine A. Hardee, Note, Balancing Acts: The Rights of Women and Cultural 
Minorities in Kenyan Marital Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 712 (2004), and Eugene Cotran, Marriage, Divorce 
and Succession Laws in Kenya: Is Integration or Unification Possible?, 40 J. AFR. L. 194 (1996).  
Similarly, Tanzania took another cue from its neighbors when it passed the 1999 Land Act, which included 
a clause guaranteeing spousal co-ownership of land.  The issue was already being debated in Uganda, 
where efforts to adopt co-ownership legislation inspired activists in Tanzania to have similar measures 
enacted in their country.  While the Tanzanian campaign resulted in success, the opposite was true for 
Uganda, where even attempts to reform family law dating back to 1904 had already been stymied for 
decades.  Tripp, supra note 4, at 426.  
144 James S. Read, A Milestone in the Integration of Personal Laws: The New Law of Marriage and 
Divorce in Tanzania, 16 J. AFR. L. 19, 19 (1972). 
24
groundbreaking Law of Marriage Act, 1971 (“LMA” or “the Act”).145 Those reforms 
included the recognition of religious and customary marriages, registration requirements, 
the establishment of marriage conciliation boards, the requirement of a judicial decree as 
a prerequisite to a valid divorce, and the presumption of marriage based on a two-year 
period of cohabitation.146 Although these changes appeared to enjoy widespread support 
among certain sectors of the political class,147 some have questioned whether the general 
public had an adequate opportunity to debate the merits of the proposed LMA before it 
came into effect.148 Nevertheless, the Tanzanian parliament’s proactive stance garnered 
it credit for “tak[ing] the pioneering step of enacting the first measure in Commonwealth 
Africa (or indeed in any of the Commonwealth states with comparable problems of plural 
legal systems) to integrate the diverse personal laws of marriage and divorce which were 
formerly applicable.”149 
1.  Key Statutory Provisions   
 
a.  General Scope and Definition of Marriage 
 
Although the LMA represents a significant step in the integration of family law, 
the unification of marriage and divorce laws under the LMA is far from absolute.  
Spanning 167 sections, the statute supplanted the much-weaker Declaration of Customary 
Law and covers a broad range of issues previously governed by the various legal regimes 
 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 21. 
147 See Rakstad et al., supra note 14, at 96-97 (noting that the passage of the LMA “was influenced by the 
UWT [Umoja wa Wanawake Tanzania], the women’s wing of the ruling party”). 
148 Although the government was required to publish a translation of the original English language bill into 
Kiswahili, the translation was only available to the public three weeks before the president approved the 
bill.  Read, supra note 144, at 22. 
149 Id. at 19. 
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operating among Tanzania’s disparate communities.150 While the Judicature and 
Application of Laws Ordinance and the Magistrates’ Courts Act provide for the 
application of religious and customary law in certain civil matters, the LMA supercedes 
the patchwork of marriage and divorce laws,151 “the precise inter-relationship between 
which was ill-defined and gave rise to some difficult questions of conflict of laws.”152 
Because family law is not considered a Union matter, however, the LMA applies only in 
mainland Tanganyika and not in Zanzibar.153 Thus, only individuals in Tanganyika may 
rely on reforms promulgated by the LMA. 
 The LMA also provides for only a partial integration of family law by applying 
special accommodations for certain religious marriages.154 Under the statute, a marriage 
is defined as “the voluntary union of a man and a woman, intended to last for their joint 
lives”155 and may either be monogamous (or intended to be monogamous) or polygamous 
(or potentially polygamous).156 On one hand, the LMA exhibits great regard for 
 
150 See generally Law of Marriage Act, 1971 [hereinafter LMA]; see also Barthazar A. Rwezaura & Ulrike 
Wanitzek, Family Law Reform in Tanzania: A Socio-Legal Report, 2 INT’L J.L. & FAM. 1, 7 (1988).  For an 
introduction into the legal systems of Tanzania’s most prominent religious and customary communities, see 
Adam Haji Bakari, The Sharia Marriage Practices Amongst the Islamic Communities in Tanzania, 52 
PUNJAB U. L.J. 55 (1994) (describing the application of Islamic family law in Tangyanika) and G. Nasieku 
Tarayia, The Legal Perspectives of the Maasai Culture, Customs, and Traditions, 21 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. LAW 183, 201-204 (2004) (surveying the customary marriage laws of the Maasai people).     
151 Bakari, supra note 150, at 62 (1994) (citing JALO § 9(5)) (“Notwithstanding the provision of this 
Ordinance, the rules of customary law and the rules of Islamic law shall not apply in regard to any matter 
provided for in the Law of Marriage Act 1971.”). 
152 Read, supra note 144, at 20. 
153 Id. at 21. 
154 Rahmatian, supra note 141, at 298 (observing that the idea that “[t]he law should interfere with religious 
and customary practice as little as possible . . . prevented an entire unification of marriage laws”). 
155 LMA §9(1).  While the issue of same-sex marriage falls outside the scope of this paper, the restrictive 
definition of marriage as found in the LMA will certainly become increasingly problematic as same-sex 
relationships receive greater recognition within the international community.  Indeed, South Africa already 
has the distinction of being the first country on the continent to permit persons of the same gender to marry.  
Craig Timberg, S. Africa’s Top Court Blesses Gay Marriage, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2005, at A16. 
156 LMA § 10(1).  James S. Read criticizes the surplassage of the language relating to “potentially 
polygamous” marriages by observing that the definition of “polygamous marriage” “has already been 
defined to embrace potentiality, as well as the actuality.”  Read, supra note 144, at 24.  The final LMA 
differs from the Kenyan draft bill in that it has done away with the offence of bigamy in situations where an 
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marriages performed under Islamic and customary law by allowing for polygamous 
unions and even presuming that those relationships are potentially polygamous by 
allowing a husband and wife to convert their monogamous marriage into a polygamous 
one (and vice versa) by joint declaration.157 On the other hand, the statute also defers to 
Christian sensibilities by declining to extend this privilege of convertibility to marriages 
“celebrated in a church in Christian form . . . for so long as the parties continue to profess 
the Christian faith.”158 While the LMA thus sanctions polygamy in many cases, 
polyandry is strictly prohibited.159 
One of the more controversial portions of the LMA is the provision establishing 
common law marriage.160 If a couple has cohabited for a period of at least two years “in 
such circumstances as to have acquired the reputation of being husband and wife,” a 
rebuttable presumption of marriage arises.161 Where that presumption has been rebutted, 
the woman may still apply for maintenance for both herself and her children if she can 
show that the couple “did in fact live together as husband and wife for two years or 
more.”162 In such scenarios, the court also has the power to award custody of the 
 
officially monogamous husband enters into a second marriage.  Id. at 26.  However, the second marriage 
will still be considered void and the man may be liable for falsely stating his true marital status if he gives 
public notice of that later union.  Id. 
157 LMA § 11(1). 
158 § 11(5).  See also Rahmatian, supra note 141, at 298 (“[Section 11(5)] confers a special status on the 
Christian monogamous marriage within the otherwise unified secular law”); Read, supra note 144, at 23 
(“the Act . . . makes conversion of a Christian marriage conditional upon apostasy”). 
159 §§ 152(1), (2).  Contracting a polyandrous marriage will subject parties to imprisonment for a maximum 
of three years.  § 152(3). 
160 § 160; see also Bart Rwezaura, Proposed The Abolition of De Facto Unions in Tanzania: A Case of 
Sailing against the Social Current, 42 J. AFRICAN L. 187, 187-88 (1998) [hereinafter Rwezaura, Proposed 
Abolition]. 
161 § 160(1). 
162 § 160(2). 
27
children, order maintenance payments or “grant such other reliefs . . . as it has 
jurisdiction under [the] Act.”163 
b.  Prerequisites to Marriage 
 
Despite the LMA’s deference to religious and customary tenets in establishing the 
marriage relationship, the Act contains numerous provisions that are generally applicable 
to all communities.  The minimum age for marriage is eighteen years old for males and 
fifteen for females.164 However, courts may in their discretion waive this requirement to 
allow marriage between minors where either party has obtained the age of fourteen and 
there exist “special circumstances which make the proposed marriage desirable.”165 
Persons must enter into the union with freely given consent,166 or in the case of girls 
below the age of eighteen, obtain consent from the bride’s father.167 Furthermore, 
marriages with certain close relatives are strictly prohibited.168 However, the Act also 
makes marriage more accessible by eliminating the payment of bride price as a 
prerequisite,169 which is a common practice among many customary and religious 
communities.170 
163 Id. 
164 LMA § 13(1).  Knowingly entering into a marriage with a person below the minimum age carries a 
punishment of three years imprisonment.  § 148(1).  Furthermore, a maximum prison sentence of two years 
is reserved for those who participate in a ceremony solemnizing such a union knowing that either party is 
underage.  § 148(2). 
165 §§ 13(2)(a)-(b). 
166 § 16(1). 
167 § 17(1)(a).  Consent will be unnecessary if the both bride’s mother and legal guardian also happen to be 
dead.   §§ 17(b), (c).  Although forced marriages actually do not have a concrete basis in either the Qur’an 
or under Islamic tradition, the majority of religious scholars in Tanzania and neighboring countries believe 
that such marriages are not invalid, despite the bride’s lack of consent.  Bakari, supra note 150, 76-77. 
168 See generally LMA § 14. 
169 § 41(a). 
170 Under Islamic law, the dowry is a part of the marriage contract and upon payment becomes the property 
of the bride.  However, largely due to socioeconomic reasons, Muslim families have been known to do 
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The LMA imposes a notice requirement, wherein parties to a marriage must 
inform a registrar or registration officer of their intent to marry at least three weeks 
before the proposed date of the ceremony.171 The official must then publicize news of the 
impending nuptials, thus providing individuals an opportunity to come forward with any 
objections to the relationship.172 With regard to polygamous unions, the LMA gives the 
current wife (or wives) the right to object to additional spouses if the husband is of 
limited means and the marriage would likely cause hardship to the family, or if the 
would-be wife is “of notoriously bad character,” inflicted with a communicable disease 
or is “likely to introduce grave discord into the household.”173 A court or marriage 
conciliation board may hear an objection and in the presence of the parties involved, 
make a fact-based determination as to whether the marriage should be allowed to 
proceed.174 
c.  The Marriage Contract 
 
away with the dowry requirement or divert payment to the bride’s parents.  Such practices contradict 
Islamic law.  Bakari, supra note 150, at 73. 
171 § 18(1).  This public notice must include basic information regarding the couple, such as the names, 
ages, and residences of the parties and their parents; the proposed date and location of the ceremony; a 
statement that the impending marriage is not prohibited by law; and a classification of the marriage as 
either monogamous or polygamous (or potentially polygamous).  §§ 18(2)(a)-(c), (f), (g).  Another 
provision that enshrines Christian mores into law is the requirement that a man who intends to enter into a 
marriage celebrated according to Christian tradition prepare a declaration that he is not already married to 
another woman.  § 18(i).  Nevertheless, a couple’s failure to provide proper notice will not invalidate a 
marriage.  § 41(b). 
172 § 19.   
173 § 20(2).  While the recognition of polygamy under secular law was intended to placate the concerns of 
traditional Muslims and members of customary communities, the right of objection arguably represents a 
compromise that simultaneously attempts to protect the interests of women.  Rwezaura, Proposed 
Abolition, supra note 160, at 190.    
174 § 22(1).  
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A marriage may be contracted either civilly or according to the rites of a 
particular religion or customary community.175 The Act provides a definition of Muslim 
marriage and Christian marriage.  The former is “contracted in the manner recognized by 
Islam or by any school or sect of that faith,”176 while the latter is “celebrated in a church 
in the manner recognized by Christian faith or by any denomination or sect of that 
faith.”177 An Islamic marriage may be celebrated according to Islamic rites by a kadhi or 
a registration officer who is a Muslim.178 Either an Islamic cleric or a registration officer 
who is a Muslim may apply to become a licensed kadhi.179 Two witnesses must be 
present at the time of contracting,180 the celebration of which is open to public in cases of 
civil marriage.181 For religious and customary marriages, members of that faith or 
community are allowed to attend.182 
d.  Marriage Registry 
 
One significant step towards the efficient administration of marriage laws in 
Tanganyika is the establishment under Part III of the LMA of registries tracking 
marriages, annulments, and divorces.183 The mainland is divided into registration 
districts, with a registrar assigned to each district.184 The registrar is obligated to record 
civil marriages, while religious officials have a duty to register the nuptials over which 
 
175 LMA § 25(1).     
176 § 25(3)(a). 
177 § 25(3)(b). 
178 §§ 30(3). 
179 § 30(4). 
180 § 27(1). 
181 LMA § 28(1). 
182 §§ 28(2), (3).  Some marriages between Muslims are held privately, in contravention of the Act’s 
requirements.  This situation most often occurs when the bride is already with child, the couple has engaged 
in cohabitation, or when the parties are older Muslims who have been divorced or widowed.  Bakari, supra 
note 150, at 81. 
183 See generally §§ 42-55. 
184 §§ 4-5. 
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they preside.185 In the case of customary marriage, the parties themselves must file for 
registration within thirty days after the ceremony.186 Upon granting an annulment or 
divorce, a court must send a copy of the decree to the Registrar-General, which is 
charged with keeping a database of such dissolved marriages.187 
e.  Property Rights 
 
Married women are granted the same rights as men in acquiring, holding, and 
disposing of property.188 Each spouse retains separate rights in their property absent an 
agreement stipulating otherwise.189 Any property obtained in the name of one partner 
during the course of the marriage creates a rebuttable presumption that the property 
“belongs absolutely to that person, to the exclusion of his or her spouse.”190 However, 
neither the husband nor the wife may unilaterally transfer rights in the matrimonial home 
without the other person’s consent.191 Where such a prohibited transaction occurs, the 
other spouse retains the right to reside in the house as long as the marriage remains 
intact.192 
f.  Reconciliation, Divorce, and Division of Assets  
 
The LMA enshrines traditional concepts of informal dispute resolution prevalent 
in many African communities193 by establishing marriage conciliatory boards for each 
 
185 § 43. 
186 § 45(5). 
187 LMA §§ 49-50. 
188 § 56. 
189 § 58. 
190 § 60. 
191 § 59(1). 
192 § 59(2). 
193 See Rahmatian, supra note 141, at 303.   
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ward.194 Courts must refrain from hearing a petition for divorce unless the couple has 
first referred the matter to one of these boards.195 The board hears testimony from both 
parties, neither of which may be represented by legal counsel, and conducts mediation in 
order to repair the couple’s damaged relationship.196 If the board fails to bring to parties 
together, it will issue a certificate attesting to the failed reconciliation and may include it 
own recommendations regarding the dispute.197 
When a court hears a petition for divorce, it looks to see if the marriage has 
deteriorated to an irreparable state in deciding whether to dissolve the union.198 A
determination of marital breakdown will examine the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the parties’ relationship, with due regard given to the custom of the 
community to which the couple belongs.199 Evidence showing that a marriage has 
collapsed may include: adultery,200 “sexual perversion,”201 cruelty,202 neglect,203 
desertion,204 voluntary or judicial separation lasting for a period of at least three years,205 
imprisonment206 or mental illness.207 Another relevant factor is if the respondent spouse 
changes faith and the laws of the religion formerly shared by both parties renders the 
 
194 LMA §§ 102.  Each board is comprised of three to six members, including a chairman.  § 103.  It has 
been noted that the reconciliation process as adopted by the LMA is quite consistent with the marital 
dispute resolution provisions found in the Qur’an.  Hashim, supra note 143, at 453.   
195 § 101.  The reconciliation requirement will be waived where the petitioner can show that the other 
spouse is unable to appear, such as in cases of desertion, imprisonment, long-term absence from the 
jurisdiction, incurable mental illness, or other extraordinary circumstances.  §§ 101(a)-(f).  
196 §§ 104(1), (8). 
197 §§§ 104(5), (6). 
198 § 99. 
199 § 107.  However, the board is precluded from issuing a decree if it finds that the petition for divorce is a 
result entirely of the petitioner’s own wrongdoing.  § 107(a). 
200 LMA § 107(2)(a). 
201 § 107(2)(b). 
202 § 107(2)(c). 
203 § 107(2)(d). 
204 § 107(2)(e). 
205 § 107(2)(f). 
206 LMA § 107(2)(g). 
207 § 107(2)(h). 
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union dissolved.208 A special provision also applies to Muslim marriages,209 wherein 
courts will automatically accept as valid a divorce obtained according to Islamic law, 
provided that the board certifies that it was unable to foster reconciliation.210 
Once a marriage is dissolved, the court has the power to divide assets jointly 
acquired by the couple during the course of the marriage.211 Two main factors the court 
considers in making this determination are the customary norms of the community to 
which the parties belong and the “contributions made by either party in money, property, 
or work towards the acquiring of the assets.”212 This latter provision has proven to be 
contentious, as it does not specify what kinds of activities constitute work done in 
contribution to the accumulation of marital assets.213 
g.  Maintenance and Child Custody 
 
Another novel development introduced into the Tanzanian legal system by the 
LMA is the availability of maintenance for women.214 Situations where a court may 
order a husband to make payments to his wife include: neglect, desertion, separation, 
 
208 § 107(i). 
209 § 103. 
210 In this respect, the LMA specifically opens up the door for informal divorce by referring to “any act or 
thing which would, but for the provisions of this Act, have dissolved the marriage in accordance with the 
Islamic law.”  § 107(3)(c).  Andreas Rahmatian points out that this means that “virtually unadulterated 
Islamic divorce law is kept in the LMA.”  Rahmatian, supra note 141, at 298.  The Shafi’i school of Islamic 
thought, which is prevalent in Tanzania, espouses an aversion to judicial intervention in dissolving 
marriages.  Id; see infra note 327 for further discussion on the different strains of religious thought 
practiced throughout the country.  In this respect, some commentators believe that the court system “acts 
merely as a ‘clearing house’ for the parties’ actions.”  Makaramba, supra note 127, at 10.  Nevertheless, in 
the absence of a divorce obtained under LMA § 107(3), the marital breakdown test will apply to dissolution 
procedures regardless of the parties’ religious affiliations.  See Abdallah Said v. Mwanamkuu Yusufu,
[1978] T.L.R. 43, cited in Hashim, supra note 143, at 452.  
211 § 114(1). 
212 LMA §§ 114(2)(a), (b). 
213 Rose Mtengeti-Migiro, The Division of Matrimonial Property in Tanzania, 28 J. MODERN AFR. STUD.
521, 525, 522 (1990). 
214 Rahmatian, supra note 141, at 300 (“This is a very satisfactory step, since such a rule is not founded in 
African legal traditions . . .”). 
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divorce or during the course of any matrimonial proceedings.215 The determination is to 
take custom into account, as well as the degree of responsibility apportioned to each party 
for the breakdown of the marriage.216 Remarriage by either party extinguishes the right 
to maintenance.217 
The guiding tenet in the awarding of child custody is the best interest of the 
child.218 Whenever consistent with this principle, the court also takes into consideration 
the wishes of the parents, the child’s desires, and the customs of the community to which 
the parents belong.219 However, the LMA creates a rebuttable presumption that “it is for 
the good” of a child under the age of seven to reside with his or her mother.220 Courts are 
not bound to award custody of all children to one parent.221 In the absence of an 
agreement between the parties, the father has a duty to maintain his children regardless of 
whether he has physical custody of them.222 If the father is dead, missing or otherwise 
unable to provide maintenance, the support obligation transfers to the mother.223 
2.  Interpreting the Law of Marriage Act 
 
Several decades have elapsed since the enactment of the LMA, thus paving the 
way for a substantial body of law interpreting the Act’s many provisions.  While some 
cases have resolved ambiguities in the LMA and expanded certain legal rights, other 
decisions have exposed major gaps in the statute.  The Court of Appeal’s celebrated 
 
215 §§ 115(a)-(e). 
216 § 116. 
217 § 120. 
218 LMA § 125(2) (“In deciding in whose custody an infant should be placed, the paramount consideration 
shall be the welfare of the infant . . .”). 
219 § 125(2)(a)-(c). 
220 § 125(3). 
221 § 125(4). 
222 § 129(1). 
223 § 129(2). 
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decision in Bi Hawa Mohamed v. Ally Seifu224 resolved a long-running split among lower 
courts as to whether women could claim housework and child care as contributions to 
jointly-acquired marital assets.225 In the 1971 case of Rukia Diwani Kinzi v. Abdalah Issa 
Kihenya, the High Court broadly read Section 114 of the LMA to include such efforts.226 
A more conservative approach, which was adopted in the High Court’s 1980 decision of 
Zawadi Abdallah v. Ibrahim Iddi, posited that a wife’s domestic services did not factor 
into economic contributions because the LMA’s drafters did not positively state 
otherwise.227 The Bi Hawa court declined to uphold the reasoning in Zawadi, which had 
relied on the original report issued by Kenya’s Commission on the Law of Marriage and 
Divorce.  Instead, the tribunal applied the mischief rule, which construes statutes based 
on the inequity that the legislation was designed to eliminate.228 Accordingly, the Court 
of Appeal held that the LMA was “an instrument of liberation and equality between the 
sexes” that sought to “cure or rectify was what may be described as the traditional 
exploitation and oppression of married women by their husbands.”229 Therefore, Section 
114 was read to include domestic services in determining the contribution of each party 
to familial wealth.230 
The judiciary has taken generous approaches in other situations involving post-
divorce remedies as well.    In the 1991 case of Joseph Sindo v. Pasaka Mkondola, the 
High Court essentially ruled that cohabitants have the right to the same remedies 
 
224 [1983] T.L.R. 32, Court of Appeal (Dar es Salaam) Civ. App. No. 9 of 1983. 
225 Id. at 35-37. 
226 Matrimonial Cause No. 6 of 1971, quoted in Bi Hawa, [1983] T.L.R. 32, at 37. 
227 High Court Civil Appeal No. 9 of 1980, discussed in Bi Hawa, [1983] T.L.R. 32, at 35-36; see also LAW 
REFORM COMM’N OF TANZANIA, REPORT ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE ACT 1971 2.3.1-2.3.2 (1994) 
[hereinafter LRC REPORT], available at http://www.lrct-tz.org/pdf/marriage.pdf; Hashim, supra note 143, 
at 455. 
228 Bi Hawa, [1983] T.L.R. 32, at 43. 
229 Id. at 44. 
230 Id. at 45. 
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available to married couples upon dissolution of the relationship.231 By granting the 
female petitioner an equitable share of the couple’s jointly-acquired assets, the High 
Court gave extra teeth to the LMA’s presumption of marriage provisions.232 The later 
opinion of Halima Rashidi v. Amon Peter represented a significant advancement in the 
welfare of nonmarital children.233 In that 1993 decision, the High Court ruled that the 
best interests of the child standard should be applied in deciding custody even though the 
LMA’s provisions technically did not cover the children of unmarried parents.234 
Courts have also asserted the supremacy of the LMA in several cases where the 
Act’s provisions potentially conflict with the rules of customary law or religious 
authority.  In the 1990 case of Doitha Thuway v. Amathi Bura, the High Court found that 
cattle qualified as marital assets available for distribution to former wives, despite the fact 
that in some customary communities, land and livestock can only be passed on to direct 
descendents.235 A more recent High Court decision, Jonathan v. Republic, held that 
despite an accused rapist’s assertion that his actions constituted a traditional marriage 
under customary norms, there cannot be a valid union without the woman’s consent.236 
The High Court also refused to enforce a Muslim conciliation board’s award of 500,000 
shillings as a parting gift to a woman divorced under Islamic law in Njobeka v. 
 
231 High Court Civil Appeal No. 132 of 1991, cited in Rwezaura, Building a New Family Law, supra note 
137, at 529-30. 
232 Rwezaura, Building a New Family Law, supra note 137, at 530 (calling the Sindo case “a spectacular 
development of the law outside the walls of parliament” and noting that such a remedy was not even 
available to cohabitants in more socially progressive countries like Great Britain).  
233 High Court Civil Appeal No. 34 of 1993, cited in Rwezaura, Building a New Family Law, supra note 
137, at 535-36. 
234 Id. at 536. 
235 High Court Civil Appeal No. 9 of 1990, cited in Rwezaura, Building a New Family Law, supra note 137, 
at 527. 
236 High Court Criminal Appeal No. 53 of 2001, cited in Int’l Ass’n of Women Judges, Jurisprudence of 
Equality Program Decisions, http://www.iawj.org/jep/jep.asp (last visited May 12, 2006) [hereinafter IAWJ 
Cases]. 
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Mkogoro.237 According to the tribunal, the board’s authority ended once reconciliation 
had failed; therefore, its recommendations were not binding and the primary court erred 
by not dividing the marital assets according to party contribution.238 
One area in which case law has been unfavorable to women involves the property 
rights of co-wives in polygamous marriages.  In Maryam Mbaraka Saleh v. Abood Saleh 
Abood, a senior co-wife was unsuccessful in reopening divorce proceedings involving her 
husband and a former co-wife.239 The ex-wife had won her case before the Court of 
Appeal, which held that she was entitled to forty percent of the marital property based on 
her contribution.240 The fact that the husband was engaged in a polygamous marriage 
was never brought up until the remaining co-wife sought to secure her share of the 
assets.241 Unfortunately, the Court of Appeal declined her request for relief on the 
grounds that she was not a party to the original divorce proceedings.242 However, even if 
the co-wife had been aware of this pitfall, she still would not have had much recourse, 
since remaining co-wives cannot be parties to divorce petitions.243 Thus, the court’s 
ruling effectively gives divorcing co-wives a superior interest in matrimonial property.  
This gap in the LMA’s provisions is surprising, as the Act “appears to contemplate only 
the divorce of couple who are monogamously married.”244 
3.  Reforming the Law of Marriage Act 
 
237 High Court Civil Appeal No. 6 of 1991, cited in IAWJ Cases, supra note 188. 
238 Id. 
239 Court of Appeal of Tanzania Civ., Appeal No. 1 of 1992, cited in Rwezaura, Building a New Family 
Law, supra note 137, at 530. 
240 Rwezaura, Building a New Family Law, supra note 137, at 530. 





While the LMA espouses “a policy inspired by caution, sensitivity and 
flexibility,”245 the Act has attracted its share of criticism following its enactment.  Just as 
organizations, such as the women’s arm of the ruling party, Umoja wa Wanawake 
Tanzania (UWT), were instrumental in passing the LMA,246 these same groups have been 
dedicated to improving the Act by receiving complaints about various provisions that 
have been attacked as being ineffective or unfair.247 In 1986, the Law Reform 
Commission (“Commission”) began reviewing the LMA, employing a variety of data 
collection methods, including hearings in local communities and the distribution of 
questionnaires to both experts and laypeople.248 The fruits of the Commission’s efforts, 
the Report of the Law Reform Commission on Law of Marriage Act (No. 5, 1971), were 
finally presented eight years later to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs.249 
One key area that the Commission targeted for reform is the treatment of marital 
property.  After citing the successful implementation of separate property systems in 
other Commonwealth countries, the Commission identifies several problems created by 
the current Act, mainly the use of customary law in determining the division of property 
and the statute’s failure to explicitly recognize housework and childcare as contributions 
to the acquisition of family assets.250 Regarding the former, the Commission notes that 
under some customary laws, women are categorically denied any share of property, while 
in other communities, the families of women blamed for causing marital breakdown must 
 
245 Rwezaura, Proposed Abolition, supra note 160, at 190. 
246 Rakstad et al., supra note 14, at 96-97. 
247 LRC REPORT 1.5. 
248 Id. at 1.6-1.8, 4:0-5:0.  The townhall-style public hearings were much more effective in eliciting input 
from the general populace than the written surveys.  The Commission only had sixty-one responses to work 
with from the latter category.  Id. at 6.2-6.3. 
249 Rwezaura, Proposed Abolition, supra note 160, at 187 n.1. 
250 LRC REPORT 1.11, 1.12.2, 2.8. 
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repay the dowry.251 Because Tanzania’s constitution provides for equal protection and 
prohibits “any law that is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect,” the Commission 
recommends that references to customary law be struck from the LMA’s provisions on 
marital property.  Not only would this amendment bring the Act in line with 
constitutional principles but also fulfill Tanzania’s obligations under the Convention of 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (“Discrimination 
Convention”) and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.252 
Additionally, in light of the Bi Hawa decision, the Commission recommended that the 
LMA should be “amended to include wifely-duties of a house-wife as contribution 
enough to entitle her to a share of the family assets when the marriage breaks down.”253 
Another problem which the Commission addresses but offers no solution to is the 
difficulty of determining each party’s ownership of individual property or contributions 
to particular pieces of property acquired jointly.254 The fact that most people do not 
possess written records of such transactions creates an impediment to the equitable 
division of assets.255 This is especially true for many households that are located in rural 
areas256 or where the woman is an unemployed housewife.257 Thus, even though Bi 
Hawa broadened the scope of contribution to family assets, “courts still are reluctant to 
 
251 Id. at 2.8. 
252 Id. at 3.2. 
253 Id. at 3.3.3.  In the years following the Court of Appeal’s opinion in Bi Hawa, concerns have remained 
that a more conservative panel of judges could later overturn the ruling.  For example, in 1990, one 
commentator warned that Bi Hawa might only be a short-term gain for women as “the National Assembly 
has not yet intervened to make the Court of Appeal’s decision ‘water-tight.’”  Mtengeti-Migiro, supra note 
213, at 525, 526.  However, subsequent cases, such as Bibie Mauridi v. Mohamed Ibrahimu, [1989] T.L.R. 
162, have indeed followed Bi Hawa’s reasoning.  Id. at 456.  Although the passage of time has enabled the 
principles set forth in Bi Hawa to become rooted in the legal landscape, there still is no statutory 
recognition of housework as a contribution to marital assets.     
254 LRC REPORT 1.12.1. 
255 Id. 
256 Id. 
257 Id. at 1.8. 
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divide matrimonial properties equally and instead continue to give preferential treatment 
to the income-generating spouse who is usually the husband.”258 The inability of a wife 
to provide courts with tangible records, such as receipts, is a major issue.259 
In the arena of child custody, the Commission criticized the practice of courts 
“tend[ing] to take as a mandatory rule” the rebuttable presumption that children under 
seven years old are better off living with their mothers.260 Such awarding of custody 
sidesteps a best interest of the child analysis, which is what the LMA mandates.261 On 
the other hand, the Commission also noted cases wherein the father of a child who is 
automatically placed with the mother “lays in waiting” and petitions for custody the 
moment the child turns seven.262 Rather than condoning the failure of courts to “have 
regard to the undesirability of disturbing the life of an infant by changes in custody,” the 
Commission instead strongly encourages parents to enter into voluntary custody 
agreements as an alternative to court-imposed settlements.263 The goal behind this 
recommendation is to foster an amicable compromise between parents, thus sparing 
children from bitter familial disputes that impede the advancement of their best 
interests.264 However, the Commission makes one recommendation that may conflict 
with the principles mentioned above.  Despite admonishing judges for glossing over the 
“best interest” test promulgated by the LMA in child custody cases, the report 
 
258 Rakstad et al., supra note 14, at 98. 
259 Id.; LRC REPORT 1.8. 
260 LRC REPORT 4.6. 
261 Id. at 4.7; LMA § 125(2). 
262 LRC REPORT 4.8. 
263 Id. at 4.8-4.9. 
264 Id. at 4.10. 
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nevertheless proposes that in the absence of good cause, mothers should be awarded 
custody of children below fourteen years of age.265 
The Commission has also identified several problems in the process of awarding 
maintenance.  First of all, in the absence of any agreement stipulating otherwise, the 
LMA imposes on fathers the duty to maintain their children “whether they are in his 
custody or the custody of any other person, either by providing them with such 
accommodation, clothing, food and education as may be reasonable having regard to his 
means and station in life or by paying the cost thereof.”266 No such obligation applies to 
mothers, who are responsible for maintenance only where the father is dead, missing or 
unable to provide the requisite support.267 The Commission criticized this disparity and 
proposed that the LMA be amended so that “[t]he maintenance of a child must be a 
shared affair, where both parents are able and/or of means to pay.”268 According to the 
Commission, the current maintenance obligations fail to adequately consider the mother’s 
ability to pay.269 While such recommendations appear to advance the egalitarian spirit of 
the LMA, it is doubtful that their enactment would significantly impact the allocation of 
maintenance where the majority of women are of limited economic means. 
 In addition, the Commission found that the process of executing and enforcing 
court orders for maintenance was burdensome and inefficient.270 Courts may order 
maintenance payments to be made directly to the custodian (in most cases, the mother) or 
to the court.271 When the latter option is exercised, the receiving parent usually 
 
265 Id. at 6.1.3. 
266 LMA § 129(1). 
267 LMA § 129(2). 
268 LRC REPORT 6.1.4. 
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experiences long delays in obtaining payment.272 Although the court has the power to 
attach salaries in order to secure maintenance, employers do not act promptly in 
deducting sums from paychecks and delivering those funds to the court.273 Some 
employers even halt payments after receiving protests from the employee.274 As a result, 
the Commission issued a call for a “streamlining of the court’s administrative section” so 
that maintenance could be paid more rapidly.275 
The Act’s prerequisites to marriage are also ripe for reform according to the 
Commission.  For example, the twenty-one-day notice period was found to be too brief, 
especially in communities where the means of publicizing nuptials are rudimentary.276 
Furthermore, parties have exploited the easy availability of special “emergency” licenses 
as a way to sidestep the notice requirement.277 In addition, registration requirements have 
been characterized as unnecessarily burdensome, especially in the context of customary 
law marriages.278 Again, this is an area where despite the LMA’s policy of unifying the 
laws of marriage, not all unions are treated the same way.279 While kadhis and other 
ministers have the duty to register the marriages they solemnize, marriages contracted 
under customary law are oftentimes performed in remote locales that are not readily 
accessible to registration authorities.280 Because the obligation to register a marriage is 
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often than not become [a] secret affair, as far as the state authorities are concerned.”281 
Consequently, the report suggests that customary law marriages be recorded as soon as 
they are performed and that each village have a designated secretary empowered to 
register marriages on the spot like a kadhi.282 
Not surprisingly, the Commission set its sights on the LMA’s minimum age 
requirements, which stand out as among the most visibly discriminatory provisions of the 
LMA.283 Although it pointed out that the draft bill of the LMA as proposed by 
Government Paper No. 1 of 1969 was in line with international norms at the time it was 
released,284 the intervening years have brought many social and political changes that 
necessitate elimination of the provision creating different ages of consent based on 
gender.285 One main factor was the fact that the law considered fifteen-year-old girls 
capable of entering into a marriage covenant, which “has far reaching obligations than 
normal commercial contracts.”286 Indeed, the age of capacity for all other legally-binding 
agreements is eighteen, as is the voting age.287 This inconsistency impacts girls who 
“may easily be coerced into a marriage by greedy parents and cause a lot of miseries to 
the girl in her married life.”288 Furthermore, because a girl can marry at a young age, 
 
281 Id. As evidence registration system’s inability to deal with all forms marriages effectively, the 
Commission cited a continually widening gap between the registration of customary law marriages and 
marriages performed under civil, Christian, and Islamic rites.  In fact, in the period covering 1983-84, there 
were more than seventy percent fewer customary law marriages recorded on the books than in the year 
following the LMA’s enactment.  Id. at 1.8.  
282 LRC REPORT 2.1.3. 
283 Id. at 1:0. 
284 Specifically, the white paper pointed to the UN’s finding that in order to preserve the health of young 
women and their children, the minimum age of marriage for females should be fifteen.  On the other hand, 
males were subjected to the higher minimum of eighteen years so as to ensure that young men finish 
primary school or acquire the requisite vocational skills to support a family.  Id. at 1.2. 
285 Id. at 1.3, 1.4.  One preliminary consideration was Tanzania’s accession to international conventions that 
“affect the thinking and outlook of the people towards women and children.”  Id. at 1.4. 
286 Id. at 1.6.2. 
287 Id. at 1.6.3. 
288 LRC REPORT 1.6.5. 
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those girls so affected are denied are the chance to complete higher education or acquire a 
trade.289 The Commission also cited “ample medical evidence” that “it is unhealthy and 
dangerous for a girl below the age of 20 years to give birth to children.”290 Ultimately, 
the Commission recommended not only to apply the same age limit to both males and 
females, but also proposed that it be raised to twenty-one years.291 While this suggestion 
would laudably eliminate a major source of inequality in the Act, it curiously would also 
preserve the disparity in ages of majority for triggering various legal and political rights. 
Despite receiving complaints regarding the marriage reconciliation boards, the 
Commission expressed its commitment to the LMA’s dispute resolution regime, albeit 
with some changes.292 In an effort to ensure that female perspectives are incorporated 
into the procedure, the Commission proposed that the Act guarantee women 
representation on marriage conciliation boards.293 Furthermore, the report stressed that 
the purpose of these bodies is to repair marriages and therefore board members should 
refrain from assigning blame to any of parties.294 In the interest of processing disputes in 
a timely manner and minimizing hardship to the parties, the Commission called for cases 
 
289 Id. at 1.6.7. 
290 Id. at 1.6.1. 
291 Id. at 2.1.2. 
292 Id. at 5:0-6:0. 
293 Id. at 6.1.3.  The report does not elaborate as to what would constitute adequate representation, save for 
the caveat that “persons eligible for appointment to these Boards must be mature enough and not young 
men and women with no family experience in order to win the confidence of the parties with matrimonial 
difficulties before them.”  Id. 
294 LRC REPORT 6.1.4.  This problem of finger-pointing has also arisen during actual divorce proceedings 
in court.  Ulrike Wanitzek cites the 1993 High Court case of Tusajigwe Kambinda v. Edward Mwakikota,
wherein the outcome of the decision hinged largely on the wife’s alleged bad behavior, in spite of the fact 
that divorces are to be granted solely on the irreparable breakdown of the relationship.  As such, “[i]t seems 
that once a wife falls short of the community’s expectations, this, in itself, defines the wife as guilty, 
irrespective of what the law says,” thus “reveal[ing] how the expectations of a good wife impacts on the 
mind of the court and ultimately on the rights of the woman litigant.”  Ulrike Wanitzek, The Power of 
Language in the Discourse on Women’s Rights: Some Examples from Tanzania, 49 AFR. TODAY 3, 11 
(2002).  Nevertheless, the policy shift away from fault-finding to truth-gathering is reflected by the courts’ 
adoption of an inquisitorial procedure rather than an adversarial one in divorce cases.  Rahmatian, supra 
note 141, at 299. 
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to be resolved within a period of six months295 and encouraged proceedings to be held in 
camera “as much as practicable.”296 
While the bulk of the proposals advanced by the Commission involve the 
amendment of the LMA’s existing provisions, the report’s recommendation to delete the 
presumption of marriage stands out as the one instance where the Commission has 
advocated for the repeal of a reform originally ushered in by the Act.297 The 
Commission’s vehement opposition to common law marriage is quite evident in the 
report’s determination that “the presumption of marriage diminishes the sanctity of [the] 
marriage institution and [is] a mockery of those who marry according to established rites, 
religious or otherwise.”298 Indeed, the report’s otherwise dispassionate stance regarding 
religious issues became quite heated as the drafters wondered, “If the state wishes to 
protect [the] interest of children born out of [cohabitation] why it should not enact a law 
to facilitate such protection without referring [to] the sinful relationship between men and 
women as a marriage?”299 
In a response to the report’s avowed hostility towards the LMA’s presumption of 
marriage, Professor Rwezaura, who served as a consultant to the Commission,300 issued a 
 
295 LRC REPORT 6.1.6.  Andreas Rahmatian proposes that any mediation process should last for at least 
three months in order to cement a “durable reconciliation” and account for the period of idda under Islamic 
law.  Rahmatian, supra note 141, at 304. 
296 LRC REPORT 6.1.5. 
297 Id. at 4.0. 
298 Id. at 3.4.1.   
299 Id. at 3.4.3.  The report’s pointed question does draw attention to the fact that children born out of 
wedlock are insufficiently protected under the current legal system.  The Commission did not seem to be 
too bothered by this state of affairs in its assertion that “De facto arrangements may be considered 
elsewhere such as in [the] Affiliation law and not in the LMA.”  Id. at 4.1.1; but see generally, Eugenne 
Mniwasa, Maintenance of ‘illegitimate children’ in Tanzania: A right or rhetoric? (2003) (unpublished 
essay, Univ. of Zimbabwe), available at 
http://www.uz.ac.zw/law/women/long%20essays/Illegit%20child.pdf (last visited May 10, 2006) 
(criticizing the Affiliation Ordinance as a measure that fails to secure adequate maintenance for the children 
of unmarried mothers).   
300 LRC REPORT INTRODUCTION 3.2. 
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defense of Section 160,301 noting the government recognition that the prevalence of de 
facto unions was already a social reality in Tanzania during the drafting the LMA.302 
Furthermore, customary laws tend to treat marriage as “a process which is capable of 
completion over time,” thus making it hard to determine an exact point at which such 
couples can be considered married.303 In other cases, men have acquired wives under 
customary law without notifying the woman that they are still married to another woman 
under civil or Christian rites.304 Thus, “Parties remain ignorant of their actual legal status 
under state law for a very long time – until one day a marital dispute or the death of one 
of the parties (especially the husband) throws a dark shadow on the validity of their 
marriage.”305 
In addition to providing some legal certainty to customary law relationships, 
Section 160 is a key component in advancing the LMA’s goal of granting parties greater 
autonomy in contracting marriage and to mitigate the vulnerable position of nonmarital 
children.  As to the first issue, the presumption of marriage allows couples to overcome 
the most significant socioeconomic hurdles to attaining an official marriage.306 
Regarding the second concern, the informal nature of cohabitation makes important legal 
remedies difficult to obtain in the absence of certain recognized obligations on the part of 
 
301 See generally Rwezaura, Proposed Abolition, supra note 160. 
302 Id. at 187.  While acknowledging that lack of national statistics regarding the incidence of cohabitation 
in Tanzania, Rwezaura does cite a study completed in 1994 that relied on data gathered from a survey of 
Dar es Salaam residents.  One main finding was that almost forty percent of the respondents were currently 
or at one point engaged in a de facto union.  Id. at 191, 192.  
303 Id. at 192, 193-94. 
304 Id. at 195. 
305 Id. at 196.  
306 Again citing the Dar es Salaam study, Rwezaura notes that “when [respondents were] asked why they 
had not gone through a formal marriage ceremony, 40% cited financial reasons, 28% said they belonged to 
different religions and 13% cited parental objection to the proposed marriage.”  Id. at 203. 
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parents.307 For example, “the lack of documentary evidence often provides an incentive 
to the parties to dispute the existence of marriage.”308 As a result, women and children in 
particular would be put at an even greater disadvantage without Section 160, since it is 
“one of the few available means for [them] to access maintenance.”309 
Despite Section 160’s concerted effort to preserve accountability in de facto 
unions, one significant gap remains.  Because the provisions only recognize 
presumptively valid (i.e., voidable) marriages, no statutory remedy exists for children 
born into void unions.310 The most prevalent example of this situation occurs when a 
women unwittingly cohabits with a man who is still legally married to another.311 Thus 
while a court is empowered to issue declaratory judgments examining the validity of a 
marriage, it does not have the jurisdiction to award maintenance or divide assets should 
that marriage be found invalid.312 This state of affairs, coupled with the fact that no 
mechanism is in place of “legitimizing” children, represents a violation of Article 2 of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which prohibits against 
discrimination based on birth status.313 Nevertheless, Rwezaura makes a convincing 
argument that the baseline measures offered by the LMA should at the very least be 
maintained because “[f]or male cohabitants who wish to discard their partners, section 
160 presents a nuisance to their notion of male hegemony and economic exploitations of 
females labour.”314 
307 Rwezaura, Proposed Abolition, supra note 160, at 204-06. 
308 Id. at 204. 
309 Id. at 205; see e.g., Rwezaura, Building a New Family Law, supra note 137, at 529-30 (discussing the 
Sindo case). 
310 Rwezaura, Proposed Abolition, supra note 160, at 205. 
311 Id. 
312 Id. 
313 Id. at 206-07. 
314 Id. at 212. 
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Despite the Law Reform Commission’s wide-ranging proposals for improving 
the LMA (notwithstanding its stance on de facto unions), the report fails to address other 
problem areas in the Act.  For example, although the LMA provides that the absolute 
youngest age at which a couple may marry is fourteen (where either party is below the 
general minimum age and parental consent has been obtained), Section 138(6) of the 
Penal Code “states that ‘any person of African or Asiatic descent’ may ‘marry or permit 
the marriage of a girl under the age of twelve years old in accordance with the custom of 
the tribe or religion, so long as it is not intended that the marriage be consummated 
before the girl is 12 years old.’”315 In addition, marital rape is not a legally-recognized 
concept in Tanzania.316 As a result, child brides forced into sexual relations with their 
husbands may have no recourse under the law.317 
Other commentators have identified ways in which the marriage dissolution 
process and awarding of post-marital remedies under the LMA can be reformed.  The 
requirement that parties establish in court certain facts as evidence of marital breakdown 
has been characterized as superfluous because divorce proceedings are initiated only after 
a marriage conciliation board has already recognized the irreparable state of the union.318 
Additionally, as previously mentioned, the LMA disadvantages co-wives who remain in a 
polygamous marriage by apparently granting a divorcing wife a superior interest in the 
 
315 EQUALITY NOW, EQUALITY NOW SUBMISSION TO THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE (1998), available 
at http://www.equalitynow.org/english/campaigns/un/unhrc_reports/unhrc_tanzania_en.pdf  (last visited 
May 11, 2006). 
316 The Sexual Offenses Special Provision Act of 1998 only recognizes spousal rape where non-consensual 
sex occurs between parties that have legally separated.  CTR. FOR REPROD. LAW & POLICY, WOMEN’S
LEGAL AID CTR., TANZANIA, WOMEN’S REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS IN TANZANIA: A SHADOW REPORT 9 
(1998), available at http://www.crlp.org/pdf/SRTanzania98en.pdf. 
317 See Interview with Francis Stolla & Anita Samwel Moshi, Tanganyika Law Society, in Dar es Salaam, 
Tanz. (Mar. 13, 2006). 
318 Rahmatian, supra note 141, at 306 (“the law should recognize the fact [of breakdown] and not protect 
perhaps an ‘empty shell’ of the marriage by taking into account whether the reasons for breaking up were 
fair or not”). 
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division of marital assets.319 Furthermore, it has been suggested that women should be 
automatically entitled to marital property and not have such protection be subject to the 
court’s discretion.320 
For all its flaws, the reforms ushered in by the LMA represent an important step 
in protecting the rights of women and children in Tanganyika and have elevated Tanzania 
as a model for other African nations.321 However, while the Act is certainly expansive in 
its scope, its provisions have been described as only a partial integration of family law in 
Tanganyika.322 This characterization is mostly attributed to the preservation of religious 
and customary law precepts for many aspects of marriage and divorce.323 For example, 
Muslims receive special treatment in that courts will automatically validate a divorce 
performed under Islamic law.324 Likewise, the Christian ideal of marriage is inscribed 
into the LMA by denying Christians the ability to contract into polygamous unions, an 
option which is available to other parties under the law.325 Indeed, the principle that 
“[t]he law should interfere with religious and customary practices as little as possible” 
has “prevented an entire unification of the marriage laws.”326 
B.  The Law of Marriage and Divorce in Zanzibar 
 
319 See Rwezaura, Building a New Family Law, supra note 137, at 532 (“It seems that the reason why the 
application of section 144 of the LMA to polygamously married couples leads to such unsatisfactory results 
is that the section was drafted without consideration of couples who are polygamously married.”). 
320 Rakstad et al., supra note 14, at 104. 
321 Rahmatian, supra note 141, at 297. 
322 Id. at 298. 
323 Id. 
324 Id. at 297. 
325 Id.; Read, supra note 144, at 23. 
326 Rahmatian, supra note 141, at 298. 
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The majority of one million Zanzibaris are Muslim327 and the remaining religions 
are Christianity, Hinduism and Zorathastrian.328 While Zanzibar does not have a purely 
Islamic legal system in existence, in accordance with Islamic law329 kadhis’ courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction over Muslim cases concerning personal status, marriage, divorce, 
and inheritance.330 Due to the inherent nature of four schools and the absence of a 
uniform code, multiple interpretations of Islamic law have developed throughout the 
years resulting in a disparity between governance of Zanzibari Muslims.331 Furthermore, 
Zanzibar’s separate family law system for Zanzibari Muslims delineates different rights 
in marriage and divorce from Zanzibari non-Muslims, Tanganyikan Muslims and 
Tanganyikan non-Muslims.332 
1.  The Law of Marriage and Divorce for Muslims in Zanzibar 
 
a.  The Marriage Contract 
 
The legal structure for Muslim marriage and divorce is established in the 
Qur’an.333 Muslim marriage regularizes sexual relations between men and women and 
 
327 Stiles, A Kadhi and His Court, supra note 1, at 3.  Approximately 95% of Zanzibaris are Muslim. There 
are a number of different schools of Islamic thought or madhhabs. Most people in Zanzibar follow the 
Shafi’i madhhab out of the four Sunni schools.  It is the most prominent madhhab in East Africa.  Even 
though the Omani Arab colonizers were Ibadhis, a few Zanzibaris still identify as Ibadhi. Additionally, a 
small community of Ismaili Bohra can be found in Zanzibar Town.  Id. 
328 Situation Analysis For Women and Children in Zanzibar, Second Draft, The Government of Zanzibar 
and UNICEF, (2001) 19 [hereinafter Situation Analysis]. 
329 Id. at 20. 
330 Norrie, supra note 2, at 407; Background note: Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights 
and Labor, Feb. 28, 2005, available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rsd/rsdocview.html 
[hereinafter Background Note]. 
331 Situation Analysis supra note 328, at 20. 
332 Stiles, A Kadhi and His Court, supra note 1, at 3; Background Note, supra note 330. 
333 Qur’an Suras 2:221-41; 4:3-35; 65:1-7, cited in SHAHLA HAERI, LAW OF DESIRE, TEMPORARY 
MARRIAGE IN SHI’I IRAN 25 (1989). Because the Qur’an (also spelled Koran) is unchanging, Islamic 
societies have historically opposed change in family law matters. Id.  
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some extended definitions include expectations of children.334 Illustrating the role that 
Islam has in regulating the marital bond, the Prophet Muhammad proclaimed, 
“[m]arriage is my tradition,”335 and that “[h]e who rejects my traditions is not my 
follower.”336 Marriage thus bestows social prestige and religious merit for Muslims.337 
Permanent marriage, nikah, is considered to be a contract of exchange with the ijab, or
offer, made by the woman or her guardian and the acceptance, qabul, made by the man, 
along with the payment of a dowry (also known as bride price), or mahr, to the bride.338 
The essence of the contract is a mutual understanding of these elements and full 
consenting capacity of the individuals.339 The contract is considered valid only with the 
presence of witnesses.340 In addition, a religious ceremony typically accompanies the 
 
334 DAVID PEARL & WERNER MENSKI, MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 139 (1998). The Muslim marriage is slightly 
different than a Christian marriage in that it is not a sacrament.  However, the marriage contract is a 
contract before God and thus has some religious obligations. Id. at 139-40.  Any sexual contact outside 
marriage is prohibited and constitutes fornication, which is subject to heavy punishment.  In addition, 
celibacy is condemned.  ZIBA MIR-HOSSEINI, MARRIAGE ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW 31 
(1993).  
335 HAERI, supra note 333, at 33.  
336 Id.  
337 Id. 
338 MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 334, at 32.  Muslim jurists make the distinction that a marriage contract is not 
the sale of the bride to the husband.  He does not have a right over her.  However, he does have the right to 
access her sexually and her reproductive abilities.  Id. at 32-3; HAERI, supra note 333, at 33. As a structural 
element, bride price cannot be eliminated from a marriage contract.  Id. at 34.  According to some 
advocates, marriage contract terms can be specified by either party under Islamic law.  For example, if the 
bride’s parents insist that she finish schooling, they can include that provision in the contract.  See 
Interview with Shifaa Said Hassan, Coordinator, Media Council of Tanz., in Stone Town, Zanzibar, Tanz. 
(Mar. 9, 2006); HAERI, supra note 333, at 38.  The woman is expected in marriage to provide goods called, 
vyombo which are usually purchased by her parents with part of the dowry.  These goods include things 
such as a bed, wash basins, and cooking pots, remain with the wife through marriage and divorce.  Stiles, A 
Kadhi and His Court, supra note 1, at 271 n.3.  In Zanzibar, bride price is also referred to as mahari. Id. at 
108.  It is common for parents to take the dowry if it is money, even though during the ceremony the 
money will be given personally to the bride. Situation Analysis supra note 328 at 33. 
339 PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 334, at 140-41. Under Islamic law, when a person has reached puberty, he 
or she has reached the age of majority and has the legal capacity to contract marriage. Id. However, some 
argue that a woman’s consent to marriage is nullified by the fact that her father has the right to consent to 
her marriage.  Interestingly, divorced and widowed women have more negotiation power and legal 
autonomy.  HAERI, supra note 333, at 40.     
340 PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 334, at 140. 
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exchange.341 In most Muslim societies, these rituals are elaborate and constitute 
important rites of passage for the couple.342 
Islamic law places limitations on Muslim women’s ability to enter into interfaith 
marriages and polyandrous relationships.343 In contrast, under Islamic law, it is not 
objectionable for men to marry women of other faiths344 or to practice polygamy with up 
to four wives.345 Polygamy is permitted under certain circumstances along with the 
consent of the first wife.346 It can be practiced with the purpose of caring for orphans 
when a woman is widowed with children.347 Moreover, the husband should treat his 
wives equally with respect to support and maintenance.348 As a result of these 
restrictions, polygamy is usually either practiced in extreme situations or by wealthy 
Muslim men.349 
Under the Marriage and Divorce Muslim Registration Act (Muslim Act), the 
parties to the marriage, the guardian of the woman, and two witnesses present at the 
ceremony appear before the kadhi within fourteen days of the celebration, provide 
pertinent information to the kadhi and sign the register.350 If the kadhi is satisfied that the 
marriage has been celebrated under Islamic law and the parties have correctly represented 
themselves, then he will register the marriage.351 In practice, anyone who passes an 
 
341 Id.  
342 HAERI, supra note 333, at 36. 
343 Id.  
344 Id. 
345 Id. at 38.   
346 Situation Analysis supra note 328, at 33. 
347 Id. 
348 PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 334, at 239. 
349 Situation Analysis supra note 328, at 34..  
350 Marriage and Divorce (Muslim) Registration, Laws of Zanzibar, Ch. 91, § 9(1).  The kadhi by virtue of 
his office is the registrar of Muslim marriages and divorces.  § 5.  
351 § 9(20).  As reported on April 19, 2006, Muslim clerics, even though hesitant in the past, are starting to 
advocate for HIV testing before marriage.  Posters advocating testing have recently been created using 
religious messages and displayed to help change behavior to decrease the spread of HIV.  UN Integrated 
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Islamic family law exam and receives a book of marriage certificates, can solemize a 
marriage.352 
b.  Divorce 
For Zanzibari Muslims, there is a three-step process for resolving marital 
disputes.353 First, the couple must consult the family elders, the wazee.354 If the problem 
persists and the marriage cannot be mended, the matter is taken to the sheha.355 If the 
sheha fails, or if the problem is a complicated legal matter, the couple takes the sheha’s 
referral letter to the state kadhi.356 The ultimate goal for some kadhis is to reconcile the 
couple, while for others, they see their sole function as applying religious law, assuming 
that the couple had already tried to repair the marriage with the efforts of the family 
elders and sheha.357 Clerks of the kadhi’s court prepare the madai, the plaintiff’s claim 
with the plaintiff’s approval.358 The court then issues a summons for the defendant and 
 
Regional Information Networks, Zanzibar’s Clerics Join Fight Against HIV/AIDs, Apr. 19, 2006, available 
at http://allafrica.com/stories. 
352 Stiles, A Kadhi and His Court, supra note 1, at 269-70. 
353 Id. at 74. In Zanzibar, divorce is extremely common. Id. at 125. 
354 Id.  This is similar to the Conciliatory board where others assist in trying to repair the marriage.  Usually 
family members who are respected come together to discuss the problem.  Hassan, supra note 338. 
355 Stiles, A Kadhi and His Court, supra note 1, at 74.  Shehas have had a role in local level dispute 
resolution well before the revolution and were chosen from their communities.  After the revolution, the 
shehas were replaced with “chairmen.”  However, the shehas were reinstated by Act No. 11 of 1992, which 
amended the Local Government Act of 1986.  The Act sets out numerous qualifications for the post and 
their responsibilities including, “settlement of all social and family disputes arising in that area in 
accordance with the customary laws of that area.” Act No. 11 of 1992.  Today, shehas tend to be supporters 
of the ruling party and are appointed by the government.  Because they are elected by the government and 
not the community, shehas do not have the same reputation as they did in the past and are regarded with 
suspicion.  Stiles, A Kadhi and His Court, supra note 1, at 76.
356 Stiles, A Kadhi and His Court, supra note 1, at 76, 150.  Others consult the local kadhi before opening a 
court case, however it is not a required step. Id. at 76.  The sheha’s referral letter is necessary to open a 
divorce case in kadhi’s court.  If the couple has not seen a sheha, they are instructed to see one before 
returning to court.  Id. at 150.   
357 Id. at 263.  Kadhis also distinguish between religious law, dini, state law, kanuni, and custom, mila. 
Some argue that customary law has not been codified in Zanzibar, however, some argue that it has been 
infused with Shafi’i Islamic legal ideas. Id. at 94. 
358 Id. at 150. Clerks wield much power by essentially isolating the legal issues involved.  Id.  
53
the defendant is given a chance to respond to the allegations.359 The parties are scheduled 
to appear together before the kadhi and they are presented with the opportunity to provide 
testimony and cross-examine each other.360 Witnesses may also be called to testify if 
there are discrepancies over essential facts of the case.361 Even though the Kadhi’s Act 
requires that all witnesses, regardless of sex, be heard equally,362 one kadhi noted that a 
woman’s testimony is considered worth only half that of a man.363 The parties can be 
called together to the court multiple times if necessary, but the parties appear before the 
kadhi in a final meeting when he delivers his judgment.364 
Under the Marriage and Divorce (Muslim) Registration Act, if the kadhi is 
satisfied that the divorce is accurate under Islamic law and that the parties are who they 
claim to be, the kadhi will register the divorce, creating a rijista.365 A divorce is not final 
until it is officially registered with a kadhi’s court and the kadhi issues a divorce 
certificate, or passi.366 The passi is an important document, as women are prohibited 
from remarrying unless the certificate has been presented to the marriage official.367 
Depending on the situation, the kadhi can deny the divorce and mandate that the parties 
 
359 Id.  
360 Id. at 150-53; Marriage and Divorce (Muslim) Registration Act, Chapter 91, 1935 and 1936, amended 
1944, § 10, (1).  Before giving testimony, parties and witnesses swear in on the Qur’an. Stiles, A Kadhi and 
His Court, supra note 1, at 150-154. 
361 Stiles, A Kadhi and His Court, supra note 1, at 153.  
362 Kadhi’s Court Act of 1985. 
363 Stiles, A Kadhi and His Court, supra note 1, at 154.  
364 Id. 
365 Marriage and Divorce (Muslim) Registration, Chapter 91, 1935 and 1936, amended 1944. at § 10 (2). 
The only other requirement for an official divorce under the Divorce Act provides that divorces be 
registered with the kadhi’s court within fourteen days of the pronouncement.  Id. at § 5.  However, few 
talaq divorces are registered with the authorities within the allotted time period, if at all.  Stiles, A Kadhi 
and His Court, supra note 1, at 269.  
366 Stiles, A Kadhi and His Court, supra note 1, at 76, 269. 
367 Id.
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remain married and work out their problems.368 If the litigants are not satisfied with the 
judgment, they can appeal within a month to the Chief Kadhi in Zanzibar Town.369 
Because of the contractual nature of marriage under Islam, Islamic law 
specifically provides procedures for dissolving marital relations.370 Dissolution can occur 
under the following situations: 1) death of a partner; 2) repudiation of the wife by the 
husband, or talaq; 3) mutual consent, either through khul or mubarat; 4) annulment, also 
known as faskh; or 5) separation by court decree, or tatliq.371 
The male spouse has the unilateral right to divorce.372 The husband can initiate a 
revocable, regular (talaq al-sunna) divorce or an irrevocable, irregular (talaq al-bid’a)
divorce.373 A revocable divorce is a quasi-divorce where the contract of marriage is not 
completely dissolved.374 The husband and the wife remain separated for three months of 
purity and if the husband repudiated his wife three times during the this time, he 
completed the talaq.375 This form of divorce is considered a valid divorce.376 However, 
 
368 Hassan, supra note 338. 
369 Stiles, A Kadhi and His Court, supra note 1, at 76.  
370 HAERI, supra note 333, at 41. The Prophet Mohammad also said, “Of all things permissible, divorce, 
talaq, is the most reprehensible.” Id.  As a result, there is a stigma with divorce because the sanctity of 
marriage is so important to Muslims.  Hassan, supra note 338; see also PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 334, 
at 279. 
371 HAERI, supra note 333, at 41; MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 334, at 36.  Another type of divorce commonly 
referred to as “writing for money” is practiced in Zanzibar. A husband asks his wife for money when he 
divorces her without her request.  This divorce is prohibited under Islamic law and is not recognized in 
Kadhis Courts.  Stiles, A Kadhi and His Court, supra note 1, at 127. 
372 HAERI, supra note 333, at 42; Qur’an 2:226-37 and sura of Divorce. Talaq, meaning to let go or to untie 
a knot, is legally a unilateral act.  Marriage is a form of contract based on mutual consent, whereas divorce 
is a unilateral right of the husband. There is a distinction between a contract of marriage and a contract of 
sale. “A contract of marriage is both irrevocable and revocable simultaneously.”  HAERI, supra note 333, at 
42.  
373 HAERI, supra note 333, at 43; MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 334, at 36.  
374 Id. 
375 MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 334, at 37.  The three month waiting period is referred to as eda (also spelled, 
edda, idda, iddat). The wife must remain unmarried during this period.  After eda period is over, she can 
remarry. The purpose is to confirm that she is not pregnant. If the husband and wife are living in the same 
house, they must sleep in different rooms.  The husband is also required to provide for his wife during this 
period. However, this practice is not necessarily followed.  Hassan, supra note 338.  “When ye (men) put 
away women, put them away for the (legal) period and reckon the period, and keep your duty to Allah, 
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if the husband returns to his wife during the three-month period and resumes his marital 
duties, then the talaq has not been fulfilled.377 The Prophet Muhammad limited this 
practice whereby a husband can divorce and return to his wife only twice.378 With a third 
revocable divorce, the husband is prohibited from returning to his wife.379 
The husband can initiate an irrevocable divorce by oral pronouncement, written 
divorce or by action-driven divorce.380 When the husband pronounces orally that he 
divorces his wife three times, referred to as a triple divorce, the divorce takes legal 
effect.381 A pronouncement is typically worded in this manner, “I, Hussan Mohammad, 
am speaking in full mind, and you, Fatema Salah, are no longer my wife.”382 This form 
of divorce requires the oral pronouncement be witnessed by two men under Islamic 
law.383 In other accounts, women are divorced without their knowledge and a third party, 
usually her parents, informs her.384 In such a case, formal proof is not available and the 
woman relies on oral testimony.385 When the pronouncement is made orally, many wives 
insist their husbands write down the talaq to establish credible evidence in the kadhi’s 
court.386 In Zanzibar, the action-driven talaq is also practiced.387 A divorce driven by 
 
your Lord.  Expel them not from their houses nor let them go forth unless they commit open immorality.” 
Qur’an, Sura 65:1. 
376 MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 334, at 37. 
377 Id. 
378 Id. at 44. 
379 HAERI, supra note 333, at 44.  There is an exception, where a wife can marry another and divorce. Then 
she can remarry her original husband. However, the second marriage must be natural, not by blood.  
Hassan, supra note 338. 
380 HAERI, supra note 333, at 44; Stiles, A Kadhi and His Court, supra note 1, at 275.  
381 Interview with Robert Makaramba, Lecturer, Univ. of Dar es Salaam, in Dar es Salaam, Tanz. (Mar. 7, 
2006).  The prophets look down on this type of divorce because there is no warning for the wife. Id. 
382 Interview with Betty Kinyenje, Att’y, Tanz. Crisis Ctr. (formerly TAMWA Crisis Ctr.), in Dar es 
Salaam, Tanz. (Mar. 13, 2006).  
383 MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 334, at 37. 
384 Stiles, A Kadhi and His Court, supra note 1, at 269. 
385 Id. 
386 Hassan, supra note 338.  
387 Stiles, A Kadhi and His Court, supra note 1, at 275.   
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action is when a husband prohibits his wife from performing an action and if she 
performs the action, she is divorced.388 
Under Islamic law, the wife may not have a unilateral right to divorce, but she has 
the capacity to initiate divorce proceedings.389 She may obtain her freedom by paying an 
amount of money equal to, more or less, her brideprice.390 This option, known as khul, is 
not a unilateral right of women because it requires mutual consent of the husband.391 
Even though khul results in divorce, it is not equal to the unilateral right of talaq.392 In 
Zanzibar, khul divorces can be ordered by the court when a woman is found to be at fault 
for a failing marriage, which is usually indicative of her desire for a divorce, or if the 
wife refuses reconciliation.393 Additionally, if the husband and wife agree to mutually 
release one another, also referred to as mubarat, then their marriage can be dissolved.394 
Lastly, a marriage can be dissolved by court decree, tatliq, or by annulment, 
faskh.395 Tatliq requires the intervention of the kadhi’s court to declare the divorce on 
behalf of the wife or to compel the husband to pronounce a divorce.396 In Zanzibar, the 
wife typically goes to kadhis court with a complaint for maintenance during the marriage 
 
388 Id. at 275. For example, if a woman is forbidden from sitting in a chair and she sits in the chair. She is 
then divorced. Id.  
389 HAERI, supra note 333, at 44. As it states in the Qur’an, “And it is not lawful for you that ye take from 
women aught of that which ye have given them . . . And if ye fear that they may not be able to keep the 
limits of Allah, in that case it is no sin for either of them if the woman ransom herself.” Qur’an,  2:229. 
390 Id. Bride price becomes payable upon divorce.  The main factor in determining bride price is whether or 
not consummation of the marriage took place. Whomever initiates the divorce usually pays the other. Id. at 
43.    
391 HAERI, supra note 333, at 44. 
392 Id. at 45.  Also, a khul is an irrevocable divorce.  Id.  
393 Stiles, A Kadhi and His Court, supra note 1, at 98. 
394 MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 334, at 39. 
395 Id.  
396 Id. While a kadhi can pronounce a divorce, he does not have the power to grant restraining orders 
against an abusive spouse. Restraining orders can only be obtained through the civil court system. 
Situational Analysis at 40.  
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and the court essentially summons the husband.397 If he fails to appear, then the divorce 
is usually granted to the wife.398 If the husband appears, then the kadhi court can act as a 
mediator or it can grant the divorce, depending on the situation.399 
From January 1, 1999 to July 15, 2000, the Mkokotoni court received 70 marital 
disputes, with 35% involving a disputed divorce.400 Shaykh Haji, the kadhi in 
Mkokotoni, looks beyond the husband’s repudiation of his wife to certify the validity of a 
talaq divorce.401 He scrutinizes the circumstances surrounding the divorce, to ascertain if 
the proper intention motivated the action.402 Shafi’i legal texts such as Bughyat al-
Mustarshidin suggest that intention plays a significant role.403 Shaykh Haji specifically 
looks at the meaning of the husband’s words and actions.404 He listens to both the 
plaintiff’s and the defendant’s claims and deciphers the intentions behind the 
pronouncement, whether it be oral, written or by action.405 He is in tune with the nuances 
of the situation.406 After reviewing the testimony, the kadhi will decide if the divorce is 
proven.407 
Most Zanzibari men utilize the written divorce pronouncement outside of court to 
initiate divorce.408 An example of a written divorce pronouncement, which was held 
 
397 Hassan supra note 338.  
398 Id. 
399 Id. 
400 Stiles, A Kadhi and His Court, supra note 1, at 273.  From 2001-2002, the administrative officer at the 
Muftis Office in Zanzibar reported 240 cases of marriage conflicts.  English Version Divorce Rate in 
Zanzibar, Tanz. Media Women’s Ass’n, (on file with author).  
401 Stiles, A Kadhi and His Court, supra note 1, at 272-73.  
402 Id.  
403 Id. 
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405 Id. at 281. 
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407 Id. 
408 Id. at 276-80. 
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invalid, was submitted to the court by Abdulmalik, a thirty-year old male.409 His wife, 
Mariam, age nineteen was educated in religious matters and would often teach him after 
returning from the mosque.410 Mariam instructed Abdulmalik on how to divorce by 
advising him to write, “Mariam, you are no longer my wife” three times.411 Thereafter, 
Mariam claimed that they were divorced.412 Shaykh Haji ruled the divorce a nullity 
because Abdulmalik testified that he thought he was receiving religious education and 
had no intention of divorcing Mariam.413 
Oral divorce pronouncements are also used by Zanzibari men, as long as the 
pronouncements are spoken in the presence of witnesses.414 One attempt at oral divorce 
was related earlier in the case of Shindano, the sixty year-old woman who was ordered to 
return to her husband.415 Under societal norms, her husband’s rejection constituted 
divorce, however, under Islamic law the divorce was not fulfilled.416 
While it remains an option, the action-driven divorce is rarely utilized.417 For 
example, Shaykh Haji heard a case where Leila, age thirty-two, sued for divorce from her 
husband, Bakari, age forty.418 In their marriage contract, Bakari was obligated to 
maintain Leila and it also required him to pay her 50,000 shillings (approximately $65 
USD) in back maintenance by a certain date.419 Because he was not able to uphold these 
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elements of the marriage contract, Leila claimed that she was divorced.420 Shaykh Haji 
found that the divorce was not in effect because Bakari had made a good faith effort to 
pay the back maintenance and more importantly, he had no intention of divorcing 
Leila.421 
c.  Property Rights 
Under Islamic law, women have equal rights with men in acquisition and disposal 
of property.422 This is evidenced from a woman’s absolute property right to her mahr, or
dowry, as she can give it away as she wishes. 423 The Muslim religion assigns a duty to 
the husband to provide material means for the family.424 As the wife is not required to 
contribute to the family’s maintenance, any of the wife’s property or any income she may 
earn, however, is considered her own.425 Under Islamic law, joint marital property is 
nonexistent and therefore in divorce, a woman is limited to administering her own 
property.426 In Zanzibar, as a general rule, husbands and wives tend to keep their 
financial affairs separate.427 Where a house was acquired by the effort of both spouses, 
however, the High Court of Zanzibar has held that the property should be recognized as 
marital property and in the even of a divorce, should be divided between the spouses.428 
420 Id. 
421 Id. at 302-6. 
422 Situation Analysis supra note 328, at 44. 
423 PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 334, at 185.  
424 Situation Analysis supra note 328, at 34. Because the husband has the duty to provide for the family, 
male children inherit a higher proportion than their female relatives under Islamic law. Id. at 20.   
425 Id.  
426 Erin Stiles, “There is No Stranger to Marriage Here!” Muslim Women and Divorce in Rural Zanzibar,
76 AFRICA (forthcoming Winter 2006) [hereinafter Stiles, “There is No Stranger to Marriage Here!”].  
Furthermore, in a polygamous marriage, if the husband passed away, the wife would inherit one portion, 
but larger portions are divided amongst the male children.  Interview with Fatema Saleh & Hamis 
Mmangea, State’s Att’ys, Att’y Gen. Office, Zanzibar, in Stone Town, Zanzibar, Tanz. (Mar. 10, 2006).  
427 Situation Analysis supra note 328, at 34.  
428 Id. at 35.   
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d.  Maintenance and Child Custody 
Under Islamic law when the husband unilaterally divorces her, a Muslim wife has 
a right to maintenance during the eda period, which is three months.429 Interestingly, a 
husband can backdate a pronouncement by saying, “I divorce you since December 2001” 
to avoid paying the amount due throughout eda.430 After the three months, the husband is 
no longer obligated to maintain his ex-wife.431 In the strictest of sharia provisions, the 
wife is not entitled to anything beyond the dowry and if the marriage was consummated, 
she is entitled to maintenance during the eda period.432 However, all Muslim schools 
tend to agree that a consideration of socio-economic conditions, customs and traditions 
may influence the extent of maintenance.433 
Under Islamic law, there is a distinction between physical custody and 
guardianship.  Custody entails care and control of the child, whereas, guardianship deals 
with the legal rights and obligations of the child’s father and representatives.434 Fathers 
generally have both custody and guardianship of their children.435 If a child is under the 
age of seven years, however, the child is placed in the physical custody of the mother.436 
After age seven, the child returns to the father.437 Typically, Zanzibari women are afraid 
to return children to their remarried ex-husbands.438 Mothers are leery of stepmothers 
 
429 Saleh & Mmangea, supra note 426; PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 334, at 183; See also, supra FN 373 
(regarding the purpose of eda).    
430 Hassan, supra note 338. 
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432 PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 334, at 184. 
433 Id. at 183. 
434 Id. at 410.  
435 Id. 
436 PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 334, at 411. 
437 Hassan, supra note 338. If there is a dispute about where the child should live, the court can ask the 
child to choose.  Situation Analysis, supra note 328, at 35.  Shafi’i rules tend to allow for flexibility.  In 
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until she is twelve years old.  PEARL & MENSKI supra note 334, at 412.   
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because stepmothers rarely provide the same level of care that a mother provides.439 
Divorced mothers may relinquish custody of children to their in-laws, if the in-laws show 
interest.440 This option is uncommon due to the extra expense imposed on the 
grandparents.441 Nonetheless, it is the duty of the father to provide financial maintenance 
of his children until they are eighteen years old.442 
2.  The Law of Marriage and Divorce for Non-Muslims in Zanzibar 
 
a.  The Marriage Contract 
 
Customary law, which is an amalgamation of approximately 120 types of tribal 
law, British Common law, and Indian law governs marriage among non-Muslims in 
Zanzibar.443 As previously discussed, the LMA was solely enacted in Tanganyika and its 
reach does not extend to Zanzibar.444 Although the majority of Zanzibaris are Muslims 
and thus subject to the tenets of Islamic law, the Marriage Solemnisation and Registration 
Act (“Marriage Act”) also exists to govern civil marriage for individuals who do not 
subscribe to Islam.445 Under the Marriage Act, non-Muslims may marry, but are required 
to register with authorities.446 The statute requires one party to give notice in written 
form three months prior to or until the Registrar has granted the marriage.447 The notice 





443 Stiles, A Khadi and His Court, supra note 1, at 74; Background Note, supra note 330.  
444 Stiles, A Khadi and His Court, supra note 1, at 74. 
445 Zanzibar Marriage Solemnisation and Registration (Marriage Act), Cap. 92 (1915). 
446 Id. 
447 Id. at §§6-7. If a person is unable to write his name in English, then he may affix his mark in the 
presence of a witness who can explain the notice to him and his mark will be deemed a sufficient signature. 
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A number of prerequisites must be satisfied before the Registrar may issue a 
marriage certificate:449 one of the parties must be a resident within the district in where 
the marriage is intended to take place at least fifteen days preceding the granting of the 
marriage; each of the parties to the intended marriage (not being a widower or widow) 
must be twenty-one years old, or if either of them is under that required age, parental 
consent must be provided in writing;450 close relatives or persons with lawful hindrances 
are prohibited from marriage; and parties who are currently married by native law or 
custom are prohibited from marrying.451 
Once the Registrar is satisfied that the requirements to the marriage have been 
fulfilled and the fee is paid,452 the Registrar issues the marriage certificate.453 Marriages 
may be solemnized or celebrated in any licensed place of worship and must be signed by 
the minister and two witnesses.454 In the alternative, a marriage can be solemnized before 
the Registrar.455 Marriage for non-Muslims must be solemnized officially through the 
Registrar as the presumption of marriage or common law marriage is not recognized in 
Zanzibar.456 
Id. at §6(2). Also, illiterate people can sign with thumbprints.  Stiles, A Kadhi and His Court, supra note 14 
at 269. 
448 Id.  
449 Id. at §9. 
450 Id. Consent can be given by a father, or if he is dead or of unsound mind or absent, by the mother, or if 
both are dead or of unsound mind or absent, by the Protectorate.  Id. § 16. 
451 Id. at §9. 
452 Id. at §36.  The Registrar has the power to reduce or remit fees if the parties are unable to afford them.   
453 Id, at § 8.  The marriage certificate can be issued any time after twenty-one days and before the 
expiration of the three months from the date the notice was submitted. Id. If the marriage does not take 
place within three months of the posting of the notice, all proceedings shall be void. Id. at § 10.   
454 Id. at § 5.  
455 Id. at § 23.  
456 Saleh & Mmangea, supra note 426. 
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b.  Divorce 
Sparse information is available regarding the divorce procedures for non-Muslims in 
Zanzibar because the Marriage Act was codified in 1915 without a provision for 
divorce.457 In a document prepared by the Government of Zanzibar and UNICEF in 
2001, it states that, “Non Muslims cannot be divorced through the civil courts.”458 
Under the Civil Procedure Code, one piece of legislation recognizes the right of action 
between a husband and wife for the “restitution of conjugal rights.”459 In injured spouse 
can seek a financial remedy if either spouse fails to comply with the order for 
restitution.460 
c.  Property Rights 
Women have equal rights to marital property.461 All property that is acquired during 
the course of the marriage is considered joint property.462 Both women and men hold 
individual rights to property owned prior to the marriage.463 As previously mentioned, the 
High Court of Zanzibar held in a divorce case that when both spouses made an effort to 
acquire property, the property was considered matrimonial property and was divided 
between the spouses.464 Unfortunately, few women are aware of this right.465 
d.  Maintenance and Child Custody 
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The magistrate also decides other issues, such as, division of marital property, 
maintenance of the wife, custody of the children, and maintenance of the children.466 
Even though little information is available as to the length of maintenance of the wife, 
child custody is determined by the court based on the habits of the mother.467 Court fees 
are not expensive, however, due to judicial corruption, a party has the ability to 
financially influence a judge.468 This injustice reduces the court’s accessibility to women 
of lesser economic means.469 In addition, many Zanzibari women are typically unaware 
of their rights under Civil law.470 As a result of these problems, many non-Muslims 
divorce informally.471 
3. Special Provisions for Unwed Mothers and Nonmarital Children 
 
Reflecting the religious sentiment prevalent in Zanzibar, a special law directed 
against unwed mothers was enforced for until recently.472 Based on strong Islamic 
principles limiting sexual relations to within the marriage context, the Spinster Divorced 
Protection Act No. 4 (“Spinster Act”) of 1985 provided that if an unwed woman became 
pregnant, she was subject to imprisonment for two years.473 The mother was also 
restricted from returning to school after fulfilling her sentence.474 The father of the child 
could also be imprisoned for two years.  Due to mounting criticism that the law punished 
 
466 Saleh & Mmangea, supra note 423.  Much discretion is left to the Magistrate judge.  Id. 
467 Id.  
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illegitimate children by forcing them to be born in prison, the statute was repealed in 
2005 and replaced with the Spinsters and Single Parent Children Protection Act of 
2005.475 Unwed mothers are no longer imprisoned, but are still required to perform 
community service starting three months after the child’s delivery.476 The mother serves 
the community for a total of six months and she is entitled to be reinstated in school the 
next academic year.477 If the father of the child is under the age of eighteen, he can also 
be required to perform community service.478 Furthermore, males that are proven or 
alleged to be the father of a nonmarital child have the duty to provide maintenance for 
that child.479 
VI.  RESPONDING TO LEGAL PLURALISM 
 
As the previous section has outlined, Tanzania’s system of multicultural 
accommodation results in vastly different sets of rights that are available to individuals in 
marriage and divorce based on geography, religion, and customary community affiliation.  
In almost all cases, women are the ones who are disadvantaged by the inequalities 
enshrined in the various legal orders accommodated by the state.  While it is clear that 
existing laws should be amended to protect the legal rights of women, the complex 
dynamics inherent in a pluralist, postcolonial society such as Tanzania call for a sensitive 
approach to reform that is attenuated to the interests of all parties involved. 
 For those wishing to advance the rights of women in the face of discriminatory 
cultural practices, a few considerations must be taken into account.  For example, a 
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heavy-handed imposition of majority values upon a community may drive that 
community to adopt stricter interpretations of its cultural traditions in response to 
perceived assaults from the outside world.480 Indeed, “when people’s identity is attacked 
or demeaned, they often react by clinging to it ever more fiercely.”481 For scholars such 
as Shachar, this so-called “reactive culturalism”482 represents a kind of “political crisis” 
483 wherein well-intentioned attempts to protect women can actually place those 
vulnerable individuals in a worse position socially and legally.484 
Furthermore, outside observers, especially those espousing secular feminist 
perspectives, oftentimes dismiss religious traditions as merely a source of oppression and 
ignore the role of those beliefs as a source of cultural meaning and social cohesion in the 
lives of many women.485 Indeed, religion can be such an integral part to self-identity that 
“women who belong to religious groups that suffer discrimination or that feel besieged 
because of their minority position would be unwilling to undermine their communities by 
making public collective feminist demands in concert with women not members of their 
own community.”486 Referring to Jewish and Muslim women as an example, Rhoda 
Howard-Hassman suggests that “women [in those communities] might very well decide 
that they would rather not wash their dirty linen in public.”487 In other words, an 
 
480 See, e.g., Gary Yonge, How to fight reactionaries, GUARDIAN WEEKLY, Aug. 25, 2006, available at 
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uncompromising antagonism towards religion can be counterproductive, as its forces 
women to choose between individual rights and spiritual or social belonging.488 
For these reasons, in addition to those mentioned earlier,489 a purely abolitionist 
approach would be an inappropriate response to legal pluralism in light of the complex 
dynamics inherent in a multicultural, postcolonial populace.  Reformation of 
discriminatory cultural practices should thus stem from genuine internal transformation, 
lest overt coercion by outside forces be met with resistance from the community itself.  
While the process of social change is a difficult project fraught with many challenges, 
“[i]f incentive structures change, cultural identities, practices, patterns, and meanings can 
be quite fluid, flexible, and open to transformation or reinvention.”490 Despite the 
portrayal of traditional cultures as monolithic and unchanging, experience has shown that 
the constituent beliefs and practices are open to negotiation where circumstances 
necessitate or encourage it.491 Islamic family law, for instance, has been subject to 
multiple interpretations around the world, which has resulted in varying conceptions of 
rights and duties across different Islamic nations and societies.  While Islamic law as 
applied to Muslim communities in Tanzania and India permits polygamy, the practice has 
been outlawed or severely limited in states like Tunisia and Morocco, where the 
overwhelming majority of the population are Muslims.492 
488 See Preston, supra note 32, at 199-200; Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza, Public Discourse, Religion, and 
Wo/men’s Struggles for Justice, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 1077, 1084 (2002), quoting Farida Shaheed, The 
Cultural Articulation of Patriarchy: Legal Systems, Islam, and Wo/men, 6 S. ASIA BULL. 43 (1986). 
489 Part II, supra.
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492 See LMA § 10(1); Jain, supra note 5, at 220; Bharathi Anandhi Venkatraman, Islamic States and the 
United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Are the 
Shari’a and the Convention Compatible?, 44 AM. U.L. REV. 1949, 1980-81 (1995); Ilhem Rachidi, After 
struggle, new equality for Moroccan women, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 24, 2003, available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1024/p09s01-wome.htm. 
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A.  The “Transformative Accommodation” Model of Joint Governance 
 
In deciding how much autonomy to allocate to accommodated communities, 
policymakers need to pursue mediated measures that balance the group rights and 
individual liberties.493 Gordon Woodman’s concept of “selective legal pluralism” 
represents one such compromise, which involves “purposeful intrusion by the state into 
customary law fields, ground in principle with reference to each set of particular 
circumstances.”494 Likewise, Brenda Oppermann maintains that “[s]ince traditional law 
is an integral and valuable element of many legally pluralistic societies, it need not be 
wholly renounced because of its discriminatory aspects.”495 However, where customary 
and religious law conflicts with recognized international human rights standards or 
ignores the legal protections guaranteed by national constitutions, those discriminatory 
provisions should be overridden.496 As Shachar points out, “[i]f the contemporary 
multicultural state hopes to provide relief to citizens whose rights are violated by their 
groups’ traditions, then theorists and legislators must recognize that the state should not 
fully relinquish its power over identity groups.”497 
If one begins with this premise that state intervention into group autonomy is 
warranted in certain situations, Shachar’s paradigm of joint governance is an illuminating 
 
493 See Stone, supra note 34, at 1224 (“Multiculturalism is a needed corrective to the hubris of liberal 
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example of how to negotiate the complexities of legal pluralism.498 In the context of 
family law, religious and cultural communities, or nomoi groups,499 would have the 
ability to police their own boundaries since it is a function that is essential to group 
identity.500 Such jurisdiction would include “among other things, who can become a 
group member through marriage, and under which conditions divorced group members 
can marry within the faith and have children who will be considered full and legitimate 
members of the community.”501 On the other hand, the state would have the power over 
issues like alimony, property division, and child support because those “are not concerns 
unique to group members” since “[a]ll state citizens potentially face similar dispute when 
dissolving marriage.”502 Thus, the state can and should apply uniform laws to deal with 
issues that do not directly implicate the integrity of a particular nomoi group.503 
Thus, Shachar’s conception of joint governance, or “transformative 
accommodation,” embodies three main elements.504 First, contested social arenas, such 
as family law, are to be divided into “sub-matters,” with jurisdiction allocated along sub-
matter lines.505 The second element, which is closely related to the first, posits a “no 
monopoly” rule that ensures that neither the state nor the individual nomoi group wields 
exclusive authority over a particular social arena.506 Third, individual members of a 
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nomoi group must be given clearly delineated choice options in deciding whether to 
invoke the jurisdiction of the state over the nomoi group should the nomoi group fail to 
adequately protect the interests of the individual.507 While jurisdiction primarily lies with 
the nomoi group, this final element of transformative accommodation allows members to 
opt-out of group authority in the face of oppressive treatment.508 The state should thus 
act as the ultimate guarantor of equality by relying on the individual rights granted by 
national constitutions and statutes, as well as applicable international conventions.509 
Shachar concludes that the existence of state jurisdiction as a competitive choice option 
creates an incentive for group leaders to respond to the needs of vulnerable constituents 
or else risk losing dissatisfied members.510 
B.  Joint Governance, Legal Pluralism, and the Tanzanian Experience 
 
To a great extent, a system of joint governance in family law has already been 
established for most Tanzanians.  This has been achieved in the form of the Law of 
Marriage Act in Tanganyika.  While jurisdiction over matters of personal status remains 
with the various religious and customary communities within Tanzania, the state has 
applied uniform provisions over matters such as consent, brideprice, registration, custody, 
and maintenance.  The Act has thus been a welcome development for judges as well as 
litigants faced with the task of navigating Tanzania’s pluralist legal system.  Furthermore, 
nonmarital children have received increased protection through the presumption of 
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marriage established by Section 160 of the LMA.  Consequently, the LMA represents a 
significant step in securing the equality of women under the law.    
Nevertheless, as the Law Reform Commission and other observers have pointed 
out, there are areas of marriage and divorce law where Tanganyikans receive 
discriminatory treatment either directly under the provisions of the LMA itself or through 
the undue discretion given to customary and religious communities by the Act to regulate 
certain issues.  A primary example is the continued application of customary law to 
issues of marital property, which can result in women being denied an equitable share of 
marital assets upon dissolution of marriage.  Furthermore, the LMA does not officially 
recognize domestic work as a contribution to marital assets even though the Bi Hawa 
decision has set a precedent for courts to decide otherwise in the division of marital 
property.  Additionally, the LMA sets the marriage age at eighteen for males, yet girls 
may be married off as young as fifteen.  Even this already limited protection for girls is 
further reduced by the Penal Code’s loophole that permits the marriage of girls under 
twelve if pursuant to religious or tribal custom.  This law sidesteps the uniform age 
provisions of the LMA and offers no remedy for child-brides who are forced into sexual 
relations with their husbands. 
In Zanzibar, where there is no uniform law of marriage, the religious and 
customary traditions have a near monopoly over important issues of family law, unlike in 
Tanganyika.  The kinds of reforms that have generally benefited Tanganyikans of all 
religions via the LMA are unavailable to Muslims in Zanzibar.  Because Muslims make 
up the vast majority of Zanzibaris, there are no opportunities for individuals born into 
Muslim communities to opt out of Islamic law in favor of state jurisdiction over areas 
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such as divorce, division of marital property, child custody, and maintenance.  For the 
small fraction of Zanzibaris who are not Muslim,511 there are not even any official 
statutes to regulate divorce, maintenance, and child custody.  In a positive move, 
however, Zanzibar’s lawmakers have tempered the harsh provisions of the old Spinster 
Act by replacing it with the Spinster and Single Parent Children Protection Act, which 
while still punitive in nature, spares nonmarital children the burden of being born in 
prison.  Furthermore, the law also provides maintenance to children conceived outside of 
marriage. 
Certain applications of Islamic law also create disadvantages for women.  For 
example, Muslim women do not have the same unilateral right to pronounce a divorce as 
a Muslim man and can only seek a divorce with the consent of her husband or the kadhi’s 
court.  Moreover, Muslim women are required to respect eda and wait three months after 
a divorce before they can remarry.  Muslim men, on the other hand, do not have such a 
restriction.  Also, even though women have to right to own property under Islamic law, 
they do not have to right to joint property in marriage.512 Again, while the LMA has 
taken limited steps to regulate distributive aspects of marriage and divorce law, these 
measures are inapplicable to women living in Zanzibar.      
 Another area ripe for debate is the continued sanction of polygamy by the state in 
Tanzania.  Current laws and the traditions they accommodate provide only men with the 
right to possess multiple spouses.  Neither the secular law of the LMA nor the religious 
laws applicable to communities in both Tanganyika and Zanzibar permit polyandry.  
While this discrepancy may simply reflect the cultural logic of Tanzanian society, the 
 
511 Non-Muslims account for approximately one percent of Zanzibar’s population.  Tanzania, The World 
Fact Book, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tz.html#People. 
512 Stiles, supra note 22; Saleh & Mmangea, supra note 426.  
73
discriminatory treatment of women under the law is quite apparent.  Women in 
Tanganyika, however, do have a greater degree of autonomy because the LMA grants 
them the ability to veto their husband’s marriage to a new wife.  Unfortunately, the LMA 
also fails to take in account the property interests of co-wives at divorce, as illustrated by 
the Saleh decision. 
 Of course, such concerns over the denial of the right to polyandry and the 
property rights of co-wives are relatively minor in the face of arguments calling for the 
prohibition of polygamy altogether.513 Again, while attempts by the state to abolish 
cultural practices must take into account the potential for reactive culturalism, it should 
be noted that reform can indeed be effected if properly framed within local traditions.  
For example, proponents of the ban on polygamy in Tunisia based their arguments on 
passages from the Qur’an, which appears to acknowledge the inequalities inherent in 
polygamous relationships.514 Similarly, recent changes to the family law in Morocco 
carefully invoked religious authority to ensure the credibility of the proposed reforms.515 
Indeed, a reflection of changing attitudes towards polygamy in the African context can 
already be found in the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Draft Women’s Protocol), which calls for an 
end to the practice.516 
513 The main objections to polygamy involve the disproportionate balance of power that husbands have 
over their wives.  On the other hand, there are also various historical and economic reasons that support this 
type of domestic arrangement.  See Rhoda Howard, Women’s Rights in English-Speaking Sub-Saharan 
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Tanzania’s unique political arrangement thus results in multiple layers of legal 
pluralism that provide for different rights and duties based on gender, religion, custom, 
and geography.  A Muslim woman may not only receive different legal treatment than 
her Christian neighbor, but may also assert more freedoms than a fellow Muslim living in 
another part of the country.  While this result is not necessarily objectionable under a 
multiculturalist theory of justice, more recent understandings of multicultural 
accommodation recognize the need to provide vulnerable individuals the option of 
invoking state jurisdiction where the nomoi group fails to protect individual rights.    
 In Tanzania, the state’s authority to secure equitable treatment of citizens already 
has a basis in several sources of domestic and international law.  Article 29(1) of the 
Constitution of Tanzania provides that “[e]very person in the United Republic has the 
right to equal protection under the laws of the United Republic.”517 Section 4 further 
states, “[i]t is hereby prohibited for any law to confer any right, status, or special position 
upon any citizen of the United Republic on the basis of lineage, tradition or descent.”518 
More specifically, the Constitution charges the state authority and all its agencies to 
provide equal opportunities to all citizens without regard to their religion.519 In regard to 
gender, Article 9(1)(g) states, “the Government and all its instruments of the people offer 
equal opportunities for all citizens, men and women, regardless of color, tribe, religion or 
creed.”520 Nevertheless, because this provision was included under the section, 
“Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy,” the scope of the 
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guarantee might be limited.521 Furthermore, “equal opportunities” may also be narrow in 
its scope and can only be properly defined through adjudication.522 
Beyond its own constitutional guarantees of equality, Tanzania has also 
undertaken commitments to protect the rights of its citizens on the world stage.  On a 
regional level, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“the Charter”) 
provides for a number of civil and political rights traditionally referred to as “first 
generation rights.”523 The Charter provides that every person is equal under the law and 
is entitled to equal protection under the law.524 Article 2 further maintains that every 
individual shall enjoy such rights without distinction of any kind.525 As a signatory to the 
Charter, and having ratified it in 1984,526 Tanzania is bound to provide equal protection 
under its laws regardless of a citizen’s gender or religion.   
Tanzania’s membership in the United Nations also reflects its a commitment to 
provide equality before the law to its citizens.  Although it is not a binding legal 
instrument in Tanzania, the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
provides nations with a framework with which to address the rights of individuals.527 
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Furthermore, the LMA purports to eliminate discrimination against women in accordance 
with not only the Tanzanian constitution, but also the United Nations Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”).528 CEDAW, 
which is the single most important international legal instrument of women’s rights, 
established a comprehensive women’s equality statement that had binding legal effects 
amongst countries that ratified the Convention.529 
The spate of domestic and international legal instruments currently in force in 
Tanzania provides a broad justification for the state its jurisdiction with regard to 
individuals trapped in the paradox of multicultural vulnerability, either through 
legislative action or court intervention.  Indeed, the Tanzanian judiciary has already 
demonstrated a willingness to invoke such authority.  In the 1990 case of Ephraim v. 
Pastory and Anor,530 the High Court overruled a customary rule that barred women, but 
not men, from selling inherited clan land.531 In its reasoning, the Court relied on Article 
13(4) of the Constitution, which states that “no person shall be treated in a discriminatory 
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manner by any person acting by virtue of any law or in the discharge of a function of any 
state office or the party, and its organs.” 532 Although the Constitution does not explicitly 
refer to gender in its definition of “discriminatory,” the Court nevertheless interpreted 
Tanzania’s ratification of various international human rights instruments, including 
CEDAW, as supporting the rights of women.533 
Consequently, the Ephraim case demonstrates that such multilateral commitments 
can positively impact Tanzanian women by providing with viable alternatives to nomoi 
group jurisdiction.  As Marsha Freeman observes, “[m]aking the claim possible is an 
investment in the future.”534 
C.  Challenges and Opportunities for Reform in Tanzania 
 
While Shachar’s model of transformative accommodation presents an insightful 
approach for jurists and policy-makers faced with the complexities of a pluralist society 
such as that of Tanzania, a program of joint governance that embodies its ideals may be 
limited by other practical considerations.  Eric J. Mitnick, for example, points out that the 
competitive effect produced by the choice of jurisdictions made available to the 
individual under transformative accommodation also depends “not only [on] clearly 
delineated choice options but also the capacity to exercise such options.”535 In particular, 
individuals who might benefit from opting out of nomoi group jurisdiction may be 
constrained from doing so due to the strength of the individual’s attachment to the 
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compliant – individuals socialized into vulnerability, that is – may have a particularly 
difficult time suddenly exercising agency.”537 
Even where a woman’s desire to opt-out might be more pronounced, overt 
community pressure or lack of resources may prevent the woman from exercising her 
choice options.  While the partial exit provided by transformative accommodation merely 
serves as a fallback measure and thus should be less intrusive to community affairs, such 
a challenge to nomoi group authority still generates a “rights vs. community” dilemma to 
a certain extent.  This is especially true for women with limited access to education or 
money,538 as “[t]he less financially independent women are, the more they depend on 
remaining in their community’s good graces” and “that without the ability to support 
themselves independently women feel that they have no choice but to accept the 
‘harmful’ cultural practices that their family and community encourage.”539 Thus, in 
order for women to truly benefit from transformative accommodation across the board, 
Mitnick counsels that “a model premised on individual agency in a multicultural context 
must, at a minimum, provide for the sort of social, educational, and financial resources at-
risk group members require to recognize, and take advantage of, jurisdictional 
options.”540 
Indeed, examining the legal capacity of women in Tanzania is an essential step in 
measuring the equality afforded them under the law.541 In a general sense, legal capacity 
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refers to the ability to acknowledge and to exercise the rights and corresponding 
responsibilities of an adult within their society.542 Tanzanian women suffer from myriad 
problems in trying fulfilling their legal capacity, such as a lack of knowledge of their 
substantive and procedural rights, as well as difficulties in framing and expressing their 
claims.543 On the other hand, it is argued that in Zanzibar in particular, Muslim women 
are quite knowledgeable about their rights and tend to be aware of the social norms that 
define a divorce.544 Furthermore, they also have equal access to mediation through 
wazee, shehas or the kadhi’s court.545 Nevertheless, awareness of legal rights is diffuse 
throughout Tanzania, where urban women, particularly those of greater economic means 
are more likely to utilize the machinery of the official courts than their rural 
counterparts.546 Therefore, programs to educate women on a local level are still crucial 
for ensuring equal access to the state justice system at all levels.      
 The kind of measures to which Mitnick refers bring to mind broader structural 
concerns that are truly global in nature, thus highlighting the importance of the work of 
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non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) on the ground in enabling women to know 
and assert their rights in Tanzania.547 For example, the United Nations Committee on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women has reported on the efforts 
made by NGOs and the government to raise the awareness of women’s rights through 
outlets such as the Legal Aid Committee of the University of Dar es Salaam and the 
Tanzania Media Women’s Association (TAMWA), as well as various educational 
campaigns utilizing easy-to-read booklets, radio programs, and newspaper columns.548 
Because Tanzania’s commitments to protect individual rights have both 
international and domestic components, campaigns to strengthen the position of women 
in Tanzania “means creating support for the effort, through local organizations and 
international networks, to share both the burdens and the benefits.”549 In engaging with 
religious tradition, Cheryl Preston observes that the success of this collaborative dynamic 
depends on the subtle shaping of everyday transactions: 
Outsider feminists need ultimately to defer to those with the greatest stake 
in a religious institution for answers.  At the same time, outsiders can, 
through questioning, help tease out whether something is going on entirely 
different from theology.  And sometimes it helps feminists on the inside to 
get support from women on the outside, especially when those women 
carry some clout. 
 
While dividing theology from culture may not be realistic on the large 
scale, it can work in individual cases and with incremental steps.  Women 
can start in their own families and with how they teach their children: 
“Families and communities can bring out social change by altering their 
daily practices.”  Many times the most significant changes are 
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generational.  We can leave our daughters a better religious community 
than the one we inherited.550 
Indeed, the burdens are many, and overcoming them requires perseverance by those 
working to transform the attitudes and practices of local communities from within.   
While Tanzania has been fortunate in eluding the kinds of communal strife that 
have plagued its neighbors, resistance to change is palpable in many sectors.  In 1998, the 
former chairperson of the UWT publicly questioned the practice of polygamy in 
Tanzania, which caused her to be branded an apostate by some Muslim leaders.551 The 
ensuing protests in Zanzibar, which in resulted in several casualties, prompted President 
Mwinyi to assure the Muslim community that “the Government ha[d] no mandate to 
enforce amendments of the holy scriptures like the Qur’an.”552 The fact even this kind of 
internal debate can spark such a backlash highlights how calls for social change must be 
presented with good faith and credibility to the communities in question.      
Nevertheless, increased awareness by women of their legal rights on paper may 
not translate into successful vindication of those rights in court.  That is to say, the next 
step involves “[a]n evaluation of judicial systems entails examination of how that system 
deals with the rights of citizens and whether these rights are respected and guaranteed.”553 
Such an inquiry reveals how strongly the rule of law operates in that society.554 The final 
question then is whether an effective state judicial system exists in Tanzania that can 
adequately protect the individual rights of those that wish to invoke its authority.  
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Rainer Bierwagen and Chris Peter examined Tanzania’s court system by looking 
at the independence of the judiciary, the effectiveness of legal reform, and unification of 
the judiciary.555 In regards to the first matter, Bierwagen and Peter found that the 
executive branch in both Tanganyika and Zanzibar exert considerable influence and 
pressure on what are considered sensitive cases.556 Tanzanian judges, as high as former 
Chief Justices, have been blindly subservient to the political parties that appointed 
them.557 The executive has even jailed members of the judiciary for rulings that run 
contrary to the current political agenda.558 Thus, the ruling party appears to hold the 
judiciary in low esteem.  Moreover, beyond political influence, attorneys and public 
officials admit that the judiciary is susceptible to bribes from the representing parties.559 
With such a corrupt and politically influenced judiciary, a Tanzanian citizen’s ability to 
exercise his or her constitutional rights is seriously limited.   
With regard to legal reform, the Republic of Tanzania has a tendency to ignore, or 
take less seriously, legal issues.560 Also, “there is a tendency to underrate the intelligence 
of the population by assuming that particular issues will not be called to question.”561 
The Constitutional Court is one case in point. The fact that it has never convened in all 
the years of its existence reveals indicates its establishment as an empty political 
gesture.562 In fact, it is argued that a former president of Zanzibar was forced to resign 
for attempting to convene the Constitutional Court.563 Therefore, there is a significant 
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unwillingness within the executive branch to remedy the unconstitutionality of certain 
laws.   
Bierwagen and Peter’s findings, which were published in 1989, expressed 
optimism that the dualistic court system of Tanzania was headed on path towards 
unification.564 Experienced jurists from the mainland had already been traveling to 
Zanzibar in order to strengthen that region’s legal system.565 Bierwagen and Peter thus 
viewed the cementing of the two systems as a solution to increasing respect for the rule of 
law and heightening protection of individual rights.566 In the context of family law, the 
consolidation of state legal systems thus would arguably aid in the protection of 
individual rights by providing a unified alternative forum to the authority of 
accommodated nomoi groups. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the host of young countries dotting the African continent, colonialism is not 
mere textbook fodder, but rather a profound historical phenomenon whose memory 
remains fresh, especially for those generations old enough to experience it firsthand.  In 
the legal realm, the distinctions created by colonial administrators gave rise to a 
fragmented system of justice based on various ethnic, religious, and tribal categories.  For 
newly independent colonies like Tanzania, this pluralist paradigm persisted in some areas 
of law, this time supported by notions of multicultural accommodation instead of 
colonialist desires to maintain racial separatism.  Because of its role as the gatekeeper of 
 




group identity, family law is a major field where community autonomy has been allowed 
to flourish. 
 As programs of multicultural accommodation have been established across a wide 
variety of jurisdictions, critics have now turned to unique problems faced by individuals 
subordinated within accommodated communities, particularly women.  While most 
countries have adopted constitutional guarantees of equal protection and signed 
international conventions calling for an end to gender-based discrimination, these 
commitments may be severely undermined by the state’s decision to let religious and 
customary traditions control issues like property rights and maintenance.  The fact that 
women are disproportionately affected by poverty in many developing countries only 
underscores the necessity of eliminating discriminatory barriers to their increased 
participation in the economic life of the nation. 
 This recent literature on multiculturalism’s impact on women has thus attempted 
to reconcile the tension between individual and group rights by advancing a system based 
on political compromise and competitive jurisdiction.  Under the model of transformative 
accommodation, the state stands as the guarantor of equal protection by responding to 
women’s claims for economic and social justice where these demands have been denied 
at the community level.  Officially granting women this option, of course, is only one 
step – measures that promote awareness of options and a realistic ability to exercise them 
are essential if true legal empowerment is to flourish.    
 The government on the mainland of Tanzania took a bold step decades ago in 
enacting a uniform law of marriage.  While the Law of Marriage Act of 1971 was an 
incomplete integration of preexisting laws of marriage and divorce, it provided certain 
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entrance points for state authority to ensure greater individual rights for women.  
Nevertheless, flaws in the statute have been exposed over the years, and lawmakers 
would greatly advance the egalitarian aims of the original Act by finally enacting many 
of the changes proposed by the Law Reform Commission and other observers.  Likewise, 
marriage law in Zanzibar is ripe for reassessment, as the kinds of reforms that have 
reduced gender-based discrimination in Tanganyika have yet to take hold in the islands. 
 A narrow investigation into marriage law ultimately arrives at the broader issues 
of access to justice and the rule of law as it operates in Tanzania.  These structural 
problems go beyond the confines of any one area of academic inquiry and require the 
continued sharing of expertise on an international scope to support social and political 
transformations at the local level.  Especially in nations where government resources are 
limited, the task of promoting economic and political empowerment of women and other 
minorities lies with private institutions and non-profit organizations.  The scope of 
services that these agents provide was all too evident from the authors’ own field study in 
Tanzania.  It is thus the authors’ hope that this article and the information it imparts serve 
as one point of reference the continuing global dialogue.     
 
